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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IMPLICIT TAKINGS

JAMES E. KRIER* & STEWART E. STERK**
ABSTRACT
Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme
Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law “on the
ground”—in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide
the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an
empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions over the
period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void.
This study establishes that the Supreme Court’s categorical rules
govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based
on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when
takings claims arise out of government action other than regulation,
landowners enjoy modest success. In particular, when government
actions are taken by officials who are not politically accountable,
state courts are more likely to scrutinize those actions.
This pattern is consistent with what we believe to be the courts’
basic project in this area: to develop doctrine that acknowledges the
importance of property rights while also accommodating the needs
of an activist state. By and large, political processes, not judicial doctrine, are left to serve as the primary check on government activity.

* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. jkrier@umich.edu.
** H. Bert and Ruth Mack Professor of Real Estate Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law. sterk@yu.edu.
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Novak and Gil Seinfeld for guidance on particular points, and to Greg Alexander, Bob
Ellickson, Lee Fennell, Nicole Garnett, Eduardo Peñalver, and Chris Serkin for reviewing and
commenting on an earlier draft. The data on which we rely appears in a spreadsheet, which
will be posted on SSRN simultaneously with publication of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
When the government sues to condemn private property under its
power of eminent domain, taking the property is the admitted purpose of the suit. But as sketched in Part I below, a long line of
Supreme Court decisions establishes that takings can also arise
from other governmental activities that trigger the protections afforded by the Constitution’s Takings Clause,1 notwithstanding the
government’s insistence that no taking has occurred. The resulting
body of doctrine sets a “constitutional bottom.”2 States must protect
property at least as much as the Court’s rules decree, but they are
free in principle to protect it more. However, state courts are also
able, at least in practice, to protect it less, because the Supreme
Court has developed ripeness and preclusion rules that limit the
ability of lower federal courts to oversee the work of state courts,3
and because the Court can review only a fraction of takings cases in
any event.
An obvious implication of these observations is that the law of
takings announced by the Court might significantly differ from the
law of takings actually implemented by the states. Yet state implementation has been virtually ignored in the literature, in favor of a
preoccupation with Supreme Court doctrine.4 A consequence is that
1. The Takings Clause provides “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Virtually all state constitutions have the
same or similar language, but the minimum requirements of the Takings Clause apply to
them, in any event, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
2. We borrow the phrase from John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political
Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 853 (2006) (discussing
Supreme Court prescriptions that leave room for more rights-protective action by the states).
3. On ripeness and preclusion, see infra Part I.F. See also Stewart E. Sterk, The
Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 238-43 (2004)
(discussing the effects of the Court’s ripeness and preclusion rules).
4. In our view, the era of modern takings scholarship began with an article by Allison
Dunham published in 1962. See generally Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP . CT . REV . 63, 64
(analyzing whether the Court’s expropriation judgments “reveal a rational plan or only a
haphazard accumulation of rules”). We consider the influence of Dunham’s contribution
later. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text. For a few recent examples of notable
articles that adopt Dunham’s lead by focusing on the work of the Supreme Court, see
generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
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we have little sense of how the law from on high works out in
practice on the ground.
Hence Part II of this Article, the first comprehensive analysis of
takings decisions by state and lower federal courts.5 We studied
more than 2000 cases decided over the thirty-three-year period
between 1979 and 2012.6 Our review indicates that in certain
circumstances state courts tend to provide less protection to private
property than Supreme Court doctrine requires, though they, and
some state legislatures, occasionally provide more. An apt generalization about state court decisions is that they regularly reflect
ignorance of—or indifference to—Supreme Court teachings, which
in any event place virtually no significant constraints on state
activities regarding property.
Part III turns from facts to theory; it aims to explain the pattern
of Supreme Court doctrine and state implementation that we observed. It is an exercise in positive theory, as opposed to the
Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN . L. REV. 826 (2006) (tracing the roots of the takings
muddle to the Court’s misreading of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process cases
as Fifth Amendment Takings); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM .
L. REV. 2182, 2183 (2004) (employing Court’s taxation jurisprudence to develop a narrower
takings doctrine in which “broadly applicable regulations affecting fungible property” receive
less scrutiny); Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum,
91 TEX. L. REV. 2015 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s inability to reconcile the
incompatibility of ideas of property and change resulted in incoherent takings jurisprudence).
It would be a pointless task to cite the many hundreds of similar articles produced over the
last fifty-some years. On the other hand, it is much to the point to note that we have found
only a few studies showing any interest in the actual implementation of Supreme Court
doctrine, and each is far more limited in scope and method than the systematic empirical
study we have undertaken. See generally Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts
and the Expansion of Takings Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167 (2016) (discussing the
nineteenth-century movement to provide compensation for landowners harmed by street
regrading); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 1549 (2003) (limited to nineteenth-century state court takings cases); F. Patrick
Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory
Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL . L. & POL’Y F. 121
(2003) (limited to a random selection of cases concerning a single aspect of Supreme Court
takings doctrine); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523 (1995) (limited to examination of state court decisions interpreting
three Supreme Court decisions).
5. Our analysis does not include takings decisions that involve an explicit exercise of the
condemnation power.
6. For our reasons for selecting this particular period, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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normative theoretical arguments that have characterized the scholarly literature. We suggest that Supreme Court takings doctrine
can be understood as the means to maintain and reinforce, in a
very particular fashion, the tension between two conflicting commitments that have figured prominently throughout the Nation’s
history—strong property rights on the one hand, and the imperatives of an activist government on the other. The Court supports
property rights with rhetoric of symbolic importance but little, if
any, operational significance,7 leaving it up to state lawmakers to go
beyond the minimal requirements of the constitutional bottom if
they wish. State courts, in turn, have mostly relied on state political
processes—as opposed to judicial oversight—as the primary check
on property rights abuse. State courts are most likely to find takings
in cases in which the government actors responsible for harm to
landowners are least likely to be politically accountable.
I. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
Because our study involves comparing what the states do to what
the Constitution requires and permits them to do, we need to have
Supreme Court doctrine firmly in mind. Recall that the doctrine
examined in this Article concerns takings that arise outside the
context of eminent domain actions. These are conventionally referred to as “regulatory takings,” but that label is misleading. Many
so-called regulatory takings have nothing whatsoever to do with
regulation, whether legislative or administrative, and regulation is
not treated as a distinctive category of activity in the doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court.8 In short, takings by government
regulation are just one member—although a substantial member—
of a general class of all takings that arise outside the context of
explicit takings by condemnation. We refer to this class as “implicit

7. See infra Part III.B.
8. James E. Krier, Judicial Takings: Musings on Stop the Beach, 3 BRIGHAM -KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 217, 218-19 (2014).
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takings.”9 When we speak of regulatory takings, we mean those that
arise specifically out of government regulation.
The roots of implicit takings doctrine are found in two early
Supreme Court cases, one decided in 1872 and the other a half century later in 1922, which extended constitutional takings doctrine
beyond explicit takings and formal transfers of title and possession
of land to the government. The first, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
concerned construction of a government-authorized dam that permanently flooded private land located in Wisconsin, although the
submerged land itself was not formally “taken” by the government.10
The second, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, arose from a challenge
to state regulation of coal mining that diminished the value of property by requiring certain columns of coal to remain in place to
prevent subsidence of the surface.11 In each, the Court held that the
consequences visited upon property owners were of such a nature or
severity that they could be accomplished only by paying the just
compensation required in formal condemnation proceedings.12
Over the years, the law of implicit takings introduced by
Pumpelly and Mahon has been considerably elaborated by the Supreme Court. The Court has developed several distinctive techniques to resolve implicit takings—using categorical, or per se, rules
in some instances; an ad hoc case-by-case approach in others; and
special, tailor-made tests in the particular case of exactions. The
9. Id. In a recent article, Tom Merrill acknowledges the implicit takings label but opts
to stick to the conventional regulatory takings terminology notwithstanding its malapropos
nature. See Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630,
1637 (2015). In its latest takings decision, the Supreme Court also speaks of regulatory
takings, but places the phrase in scare quotes, perhaps suggesting an awareness that the
terminology is inapt. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015).
10. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 167 (1871). Pumpelly was decided twenty-five years before the
Takings Clause was made applicable to the states. See supra note 1. But the Wisconsin
Constitution had language very similar to that in the U.S. Constitution, and the Court was
reviewing a federal circuit court’s interpretation of the state provision. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at
176-77.
11. 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).
12. Id. at 414-15; Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 182. A number of scholars have argued, with force,
that Mahon was not a takings case at all, but a substantive due process case. See, e.g., Robert
Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and
Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613,
667-68 (1996) (arguing that the Takings Clause had no place in Mahon); William Michael
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO . L.J. 813,
856 (1998).
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Court has also fashioned rules regarding remedies and access to
federal judicial oversight of state takings decisions.
A. Categorical Rules
The Court has articulated two categorical takings rules. First,
government action resulting in permanent physical occupation of
private land is always a taking.13 Pumpelly is probably the origin of
the rule, but Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. is its
most prominent contemporary statement.14 In Loretto, owners of
apartment buildings challenged a New York statute permitting
cable television companies to install connection facilities on apartment buildings without landlord consent.15 The Court found a
taking notwithstanding the statute’s trivial impact.16 Horne v.
Department of Agriculture reinforced this rule and extended it to
personal property.17 In Horne, raisin growers challenged “marketing
orders” requiring them to turn over a percentage of their raisins to
the government in order to maintain stable markets for raisins.18
The Court held that Loretto’s “reasoning—both with respect to
history and logic—is equally applicable to a physical appropriation
of personal property.”19
The second categorical rule, established in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, is that government action “den[ying] all economically beneficial or productive use of land” is always a taking.20
The South Carolina legislation involved in Lucas had the effect of
barring Mr. Lucas from developing any permanent habitable structures on several island lots, and the state trial court found that the
13. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
14. Id. (finding a taking when a New York statute required landlords to allow cable television companies to install connection facilities on their buildings).
15. Id.
16. Id. The compensation eventually awarded in the case amounted to one dollar per
property. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 434 (N.Y.
1983) (holding that a statutorily created commission, rather than a court, may determine
compensation for a taking, and upholding the prior compensation determinations); see also
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423-24 (stating the commission determined one dollar to be just compensation).
17. 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015).
18. Id. at 2424-25.
19. Id. at 2427.
20. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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law rendered Lucas’s lots “valueless.”21 This gives rise to an
ambiguity in the reach of the categorical rule. The rule could apply
in cases in which the government action wipes out “all economically
beneficial or productive use of land,” or, instead, it could apply only
in cases in which the action wipes out literally all market value.22
The precise meaning of the wipeout rule remains unresolved. We
refer to all cases using either meaning as “wipeout” cases.
Lucas also states an exception to its categorical takings rule: government regulations that prohibit common law nuisances do not
give rise to takings liability, even if landowners are left with no
economically productive uses.23 Moreover, Lucas does not apply to
temporary wipeouts, as the Court subsequently held in a case involving building moratoria that forestalled building on land around
Lake Tahoe for thirty-two months in order to study the impact of
development on the lake.24 Similarly, Loretto does not apply to
physical intrusions that are only temporary.25 Temporary wipeouts
and temporary physical intrusions might still amount to takings,
however, depending on how they fare under the ad hoc approach to
implicit takings used to resolve all cases not settled by the Court’s
categorical rules.26 This, as it happens, is most cases. As we shall
see, the Court itself has acknowledged that Loretto and Lucas will
seldom come into play.

21. Id. at 1009.
22. Id. at 1009, 1015.
23. Id. at 1029. This is one of four categorical no-takings rules developed by the Court.
The others are the forfeiture exception permitting government seizure of property used in the
commission of crimes; the navigation servitude exception, excluding liability for damages to
property caused by federal regulation of navigable waters; and the conflagration exception,
excluding liability for damages caused by fire control measures. See generally DAVID A. DANA
& THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 110-20 (2002) (describing the four categorical notakings rules developed by the court).
24. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341-42
(2002).
25. The Court’s practice is to speak of permanent physical intrusions as “occupations” and
temporary physical intrusions as “invasions.” See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
26. See infra Part I.B.
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B. Ad Hoc Balancing
The ad hoc approach owes its moniker to Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,27 but its methodology dates back to
Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Mahon. Holmes observed
that while government could hardly go on if obliged to pay compensation every time its actions diminished the value of property, there
had to be limits.28 When diminution goes “too far,” the action in
question will be treated as a taking,29 unless it is accompanied by
reciprocal benefits to property owners, or justified as a means to
protect public safety.30 How far is too far is “a question of degree”31
that “depends upon the particular facts”;32 it “cannot be disposed of
by general propositions.”33 In the words of Penn Central, the decision
in any case left unresolved by a categorical rule turns on “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” with several factors being of
“particular significance.”34
Some, but not all, of the factors discussed by the Court figured in
Mahon and other early precedents; several, however, found their
first mention in Penn Central.35 Professors Dana and Merrill list
the factors as follows: the degree of diminution in value; whether
the property owners had reasonable investment-backed expectations; whether the government action involved a physical invasion,
as opposed to a permanent occupation; whether the action aimed at
noxious uses of property, which, presumably, did not amount to
common law nuisances; whether an average reciprocity of advantage
existed; and whether the regulation destroyed a recognized property right.36 Dana and Merrill go on to consider each of these factors
27. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
28. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
29. Id. at 415.
30. See id. at 414-15.
31. Id. at 416.
32. Id. at 413.
33. Id. at 416.
34. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
35. For example, in Penn Central the Court noted that takings doctrine considers “the
parcel as a whole,” not as “discrete segments.” Id. at 130-31. For a discussion of difficulties
generated by this denominator problem, and various approaches courts have taken to determine what constitutes the “parcel as a whole,” see generally John E. Fee, Comment,
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994).
36. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 23, at 132.

2016]

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IMPLICIT TAKINGS

45

at length,37 but the exercise leaves them skeptical about the virtues
of Penn Central’s methodology, primarily because the weight and
import of its list of factors, and the relationships between them, are
nowhere explained.38 “It would dignify the approach too much to
describe it as a multi-factoral test or even a balancing test. All one
can say for certain is that the method is ad hoc.”39
C. Wrinkles in the Doctrine
The process of ad hoc review, and to some degree categorical
decision-making, gives rise to several issues not clearly addressed
by the rules themselves. A handful of these are recurring, and the
Court has developed doctrines to deal with them.
1. The Denominator Problem and Conceptual Severance
Begin with the denominator problem, which arises in any case
involving diminution in the value of an owner’s property. Whether
the allegation is that essentially all of the value has been wiped out,
or instead that it has at least been unduly diminished, there is the
matter of figuring out just what the “property” is.40 If government
action restricts development of some portion of a parcel of land, is
the restriction’s impact to be considered in light of the remaining
value of the parcel “as a whole,” or in terms of the remaining value
of the (conceptually severed) portion?41 The Court’s opinions to date
have rejected conceptual severance; restrictions are to be considered
in light of the remaining value of the parcel as a whole, broadly
construed.42

37. Id. at 134-64. Presumably, physical invasions and controls on noxious activities that
do not trigger the Loretto and Lucas per se rules might nevertheless matter in making an ad
hoc decision about whether a particular government action did, or did not, amount to a taking.
See id. at 142-43, 148.
38. See id. at 134.
39. Id. at 131.
40. See Fee, supra note 35, at 1536.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1550. For further discussion of difficulties generated by the denominator
problem, and various approaches courts have taken to determine what constitutes the parcel
as a whole, see id. at 1538-45.
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2. Counting Benefits that Ameliorate Regulatory Impact
A second twist in the Court’s doctrine has a similar effect.
Suppose that a regulation impacting the value of regulated property
has, as part of the regulatory package itself, a provision that lessens
the economic impact by providing benefits to the landowner that
would otherwise not be available. If these benefits are considered in
calculating the diminution in value, then a loss so substantial as to
be a compensable taking without the benefit provision might be
regarded as not so substantial given the benefit. The Court made
exactly this move in Penn Central, in which the challenged legislation denied the owner of Grand Central Station the right to develop
airspace over the station, but at the same time provided transferable development rights (TDRs) that permitted more extensive
development on neighboring parcels than would otherwise be allowed.43 The TDRs, the Court held, “mitigate whatever financial
burdens the law has imposed ... and, for that reason, are to be taken
into account in considering the impact of regulation.”44
3. The Effect of Purchase with Knowledge of Government
Imposition
A final twist takes us back to Lucas and its exception to takings
liability in the case of common law nuisance controls.45 The rationale behind the exception is that restrictions on ownership imposed
by “background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance” inhere in an owner’s title, leaving no room to complain that
rights were compromised because in fact they did not exist at the
outset.46 Suppose then that A owns a parcel of land at time t1, that
the government regulates it to the point of a permanent wipeout at
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1978).
44. Id. at 137. The same reasoning would seem to apply to Lucas wipeout cases as well;
the consequence that government programs wipe out all economic value (or all economically
beneficial use) would not work for categorical takings, so long as they provide some special
and reasonably substantial benefits to the owners of regulated property. All such programs,
it seems, would be governed by a Penn Central-type analysis, in which, of course, the benefits
provision would weigh in once again in determining whether the (net) diminution in value
went too far.
45. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992).
46. Id. at 1029.

2016]

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IMPLICIT TAKINGS

47

t2, and that B takes title from A at t3 and thereafter brings suit
challenging the regulation as a categorical taking. It might seem
that B has no grounds to claim a taking given that B had at least
constructive notice of the regulation at the time of purchase. Put in
the terms of Lucas, the argument would be that B purchased subject
to a pre-existing limitation on title; put in the terms of Penn
Central, B had no investment-backed expectation. Both arguments
were advanced, unsuccessfully, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.47
Regulations that amount to takings, the Court held, “do not become
less so through passage of time or title.”48 If the rule were otherwise,
“postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its
obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how
extreme or unreasonable.”49 Perhaps legislation can at times be
deemed a background principle of state property law, but it can
never become so “by mere virtue of the passage of title.... A regulation or common-law rule cannot be a background principle for some
owners but not for others.”50
D. Exactions
Exactions are local government measures requiring land developers to provide goods and services, or pay money (impact fees) as
a condition of project approval.51 Historically, governments paid for
most public improvements with funds provided by property taxes
and government grants.52 When private land development imposed
specific burdens on local infrastructure, exactions were commonly
used to expand the necessary public facilities.53 But eventually local
governments came to see that exactions could be a handy source of
47. See 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001).
48. Id. at 627.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 630. The Court went on to uphold the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s finding
that the challenged regulations did not deprive petitioner’s property of all economically
valuable uses, and thus did not work a categorical taking. Id. at 630-32. A taking might still
be found under the ad hoc approach, and the Court remanded accordingly. Id. at 632.
51. Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 613 (2004).
52. Laurie Reynolds & Carlos A. Ball, Exactions and the Privatization of the Public
Sphere, 21 J.L. & POL. 451, 453-54 (2005).
53. Fenster, supra note 51, at 623-24.
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revenue.54 They enacted development restrictions for the very purpose of relaxing them, granting building permits to developers only
if they agreed in exchange to build public facilities or provide the
funds for them.55 The method was abused; exactions came to bear
little relationship to the particular burdens created by development.56 The Supreme Court intervened, using the Takings Clause
to police government zeal.
The three key Supreme Court cases are Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, Dolan v. City of Tigard, and Koontz v. St.
Johns River Management District.57 The standards they establish
are sui generis, applicable only to exactions. Nollan requires that
there be an “essential nexus” between the burden created by development and the exaction on which a development permit is
conditioned.58 If, for example, a commercial development would
create the need for more public parking, the government may not
insist in exchange that the developer dedicate land to a public park.
Dolan adds a “rough proportionality” limitation.59 If the government
wants to exact increased parking facilities, it may do so only to the
extent necessary to accommodate the increased demand that would
result from the development. In Nollan and Dolan alike, the relationships between regulatory ends and means are to be reviewed
with heightened scrutiny, more demanding than the deferential
rational basis standard usually applied to judicial review of
economic regulations.60
Both Nollan and Dolan involved nonmonetary exactions (land
dedications and construction of public facilities), and many commentators assumed that the Court would leave monetary exactions
(impact fees) up to the states. Koontz proved them wrong, holding
against strong dissent that Nollan and Dolan apply to permits
conditioned on money payments.61 The case was decided after the
54. Reynolds & Ball, supra note 52, at 455-56.
55. Fenster, supra note 51, at 623.
56. Reynolds & Ball, supra note 52, at 453.
57. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
58. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
59. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
60. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 840-41; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91. See generally Fenster,
supra note 51.
61. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
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closing date of our data search, but we shall have occasion to mention it.
E. Remedies
For many years, a finding of an implicit taking did not necessarily result in payment of compensation to aggrieved landowners.
Instead, some courts awarded declaratory or injunctive relief.62 If
the government wished to proceed thereafter, it either had to bring
an eminent domain proceeding or modify its action in hopes of avoiding the takings problem.63 If the government chose the latter
alternative, losses suffered by property owners in the meanwhile
went uncompensated.64 Given that the government could try and try
again, and again, the “meanwhile” could go on interminably.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles called a halt to this practice.65 The Court held that if
government action results in an implicit taking, then the government must pay just compensation from the time the action first
worked the taking until the time the action is abandoned or altered
in such a way that no taking occurs.66
F. Ripeness and Preclusion
We turn finally to the Court’s ripeness and preclusion rules. The
first prong of the Court’s ripeness doctrine—applicable in both state
and federal courts—deems a developer’s takings claim unripe until
the developer obtains a definitive rejection of a development plan.67
62. See, e.g., Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331, 1338-39 (D.R.I. 1986), aff’d, 836
F.2d 1340 (1st Cir. 1987).
63. See, e.g., id. at 1339 (ordering government to reconsider permit application without
regard to unconstitutional factors).
64. See, e.g., id.
65. 482 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1987).
66. Id. at 321-22. First English adopted a view first expressed by Justice Brennan. Id. at
315 (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). Some state courts found the dissent so convincing that they
accepted it without waiting for the Court to do so. See, e.g., Gene R. Rankin, The First Bite at
the Apple: State Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence Antedating First English, 22 URB.
LAW . 417, 417 (1990).
67. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 193-94 (1985).
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If a building inspector or planning commission denies an application because the developer needs variances, the developer may not
bring a takings claim without first applying for those variances.68
The second prong limits access to federal courts with respect to
claims that state or local government action has worked a taking.69
States are free to take property for legitimate government purposes,
provided that they pay.70 Because no constitutional violation occurs
until just compensation has been denied, constitutional challenges
in the federal courts are generally not ripe until a state court makes
a final decision denying compensation.71 Moreover, if a state court
rejects a landowner’s claim that the government’s action constituted
a taking requiring compensation, the state determination will
generally preclude the landowner from seeking compensation in
federal court, even if the landowner attempted to raise only state
constitutional claims in the state court proceeding.72
II. STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
We turn now from what the Supreme Court says about takings to
our survey of what state lawmakers do about takings. As we have
seen in Part I, the Court’s doctrine binds state lawmakers in some
ways but gives them extraordinary latitude in other ways. We wanted to see how faithful state lawmakers have been to their constitutional obligations, and how inclined they have been to move beyond
them—to protect property rights more than the Court says they
must.
We began our empirical study with the work of state courts (we
knew that state legislative activity would require far less data processing). Initially, we organized the state court decisions in terms of
the classification system suggested by the Court’s opinions—a
category for per se takings claims based on permanent physical
invasions; another for per se takings claims based on wipeouts not
arising from common law nuisance regulation; a third for cases
68. Id.
69. Id. at 194, 199-200.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195.
72. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM . & MARY L.
REV. 251, 253-54 (2006).
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involving ad hoc review; and a fourth for exaction cases. We soon
saw, however, that these general categories did not discriminate
sufficiently among the wide variety of implicit takings claims we
found in our collection of cases. This led us to develop a longer list
of categories that identified claims arising from condemnation blight
and from government enterprise. Even though that exercise let us
identify patterns of judicial action that would not have been
predicted simply from a reading of Supreme Court opinions, there
was a deficiency in our approach. We, like the Court, focused only
on the nature of the government action in question, and the consequences of the action for affected landowners, yet our data
suggested that the nature of the government decision maker, and
the nature of the aggrieved claimant, also appear to play roles in
state court decisions. Implicit takings claims might arise from
actions by politically accountable public agencies, faceless bureaucrats, or ground-level employees; the aggrieved parties might be a
homeowner, small-business owner, or instead a developer. We shall
see below that the success rate of property owners in litigated
takings cases varies considerably depending on these considerations.
A. Methodology
We assembled our database from cases abstracted in Just Compensation, self-described as “a monthly reporting service on eminent
domain, inverse condemnation, and relocation assistance law.”73 The
periodical was published regularly from 1957 until June 2012; its
editor from October 1974 on was Gideon Kanner, the well-known
land use lawyer and law professor.74 We relied on the Just Compensation reports in order to avoid two problems that would arise were
we to use LexisNexis or Westlaw. First, any effort to be entirely
comprehensive would generate thousands of false positives—cases
in which words like “taking” or ”compensation” were used out of
context—and measures to eliminate those occasions would have
made the project impossible to complete in a reasonable period of
73. J U S T C O M P E N S A T I O N , http://www.justcompensation.com/ [https://perma.cc/6A2FK8X8].
74. Id.
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time. Second, our own conscious or unconscious preconceptions and
biases would inevitably color any efforts we made to eliminate false
positives electronically, by developing a narrower, more targeted
search. Of course, the cases included in Just Compensation could
reflect selection biases on Kanner’s part, but we thought that risk
insignificant. Since Kanner’s cases were culled from reading advance sheets, they were not plagued by the biases inherent in an
electronic search based on word usage. Moreover, because the Just
Compensation reports were prepared as the cases were decided,
there was little likelihood that important entries would be omitted
because the issues involved did not fit today’s ideas about what
constitutes a takings case. Finally, whatever biases might mar the
Just Compensation sample were not our biases, thus reducing the
possibility that our results would simply reflect our initial selection
of data.
We began our study with the January 1979 issue of Just Compensation (and reviewed every monthly issue from that date forward,
until publication ceased at the end of June 2012). We chose 1979
because we consider Penn Central, decided the year before, as the
first of the modern takings cases, and the first case to make clear
that regulatory measures could result in implicit takings.75 Because
our focus is on implicit takings cases, we did not include those cases
in which the Just Compensation abstract made it clear that
government had explicitly exercised its eminent domain power (a
majority of the cases abstracted in Just Compensation fell into that
latter category). We also excluded other categories of cases, among
them personal property cases, cases involving land located outside
the fifty states and the District of Columbia, suits between government entities, and cases in which the court failed to reach a landowner’s takings claim because the landowner had other remedies
available, making it unnecessary to resolve the landowner’s takings
claims. Often we could not make the decision to exclude these cases
until after we read them. As a result, we read many more cases than
the total in our database.
75. Prior to Penn Central, some state courts considered allegations of unduly burdensome
regulatory activity in terms of substantive due process, as opposed to the Takings Clause,
notwithstanding Justice Holmes’s early statement that if “regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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We selected several years for which each of us read all of the
cases and conferred to make sure we were applying similar standards, both in terms of case selection and categorization. We then
divided the remaining years. At least one of us read each case; we
did not delegate any of the reading or categorizing to research assistants. We were learning by doing, and, by the end of our first pass
through the data, we realized a second pass was in order, both to
collect fresh information on matters we had not at first realized
were significant, and to check the accuracy and consistency of our
findings. Our final database includes 2020 cases.76
B. Categorization
We placed each considered case in one of seven categories based
on the character and consequences of the government action involved (taken together, the categories encompass more than 99
percent of all the takings cases we collected):
1. Regulations that allegedly caused wipeouts
2. Other regulations (but not involving physical intrusions)
3. Exaction cases
4. Flooding cases
5. Physical intrusion cases (other than flooding)
6. Cases in which government operation of an enterprise harms
a landowner (other than by physical invasion)
7. Condemnation blight cases

The first two categories include actual “regulatory takings” cases,
which is to say those arising from regulatory activity, such as land
use restrictions. The exaction cases, of course, involve the issues the
Court addressed in Nollan, Dolan, and, most recently, Koontz. The
next three categories (4-6) do not typically involve regulation at all,
but some other governmental action with invasive or noninvasive
consequences to landowners (such as backups from malfunctioning
sewer systems, flooding caused by government regrading of roads,
physical invasions to excavate land or remove a dangerous structure, digging of public wells that reduce the water supply in some
76. Our sample is far larger and thoroughgoing than is the case in the few other empirical
studies undertaken to date. See, e.g., Hubbard et al., supra note 4; Rosenberg, supra note 4.

54

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:35

areas, or airport construction that interferes with the enjoyment of
land). The final category embraces cases of condemnation blight,
instances in which the government never institutes formal condemnation proceedings but announces impending condemnation or
similar government actions that essentially preclude owners from
making otherwise permissible uses or improvements of their land.
The outcome of each case was designated as one of the following:
Taking, No Taking, Remand, Denial of Summary Judgment, or
Ripeness.77 Whenever a court found even a partial taking, we designated the case as a “Taking.” We subsequently merged the Remand
and Denial of Summary Judgment designations for statistical purposes because both involved cases in which the court found no
taking but left open the theoretical possibility that the landowner
could prevail at some point in the future. Ripeness cases, in contrast, are almost invariably cases in which the landowner’s claim is
dismissed, albeit not “on the merits.” We further categorized the
cases to see whether there might be a correlation between the
identity of the government decision maker or the identity of the
claimant seeking compensation, and the outcome of the takings
case. We explore that issue in greater detail below.
C. Findings
We have said that a study of the implicit takings cases decided
since 1979 reveals that the conventional “regulatory takings” label
suggests an image that is both incomplete and inaccurate.78 Takings
claims arising from government regulation (what we mean when we
speak of “regulatory takings”) constitute only a fraction of all implicit takings. As Table 1 illustrates, although regulatory takings claims
account for 64.2 percent of total implicit takings claims, they make
up a much smaller proportion (41.8 percent) of successful implicit
takings claims. Second, even among regulatory takings claims, the
supposedly sharp division between per se takings and ad hoc Penn
Central balancing does not play out the way one might predict from
reading Supreme Court opinions.

77. A small number of other cases were decided on other grounds, such as preclusion or
lack of jurisdiction.
78. See supra Part I.
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Table 1. Regulatory Takings as a Fraction of All Implicit Takings
Total Cases

Cases Finding Taking

Regulation Cases

1286

134

Other Implicit Taking

716

187

64.2%

41.8%

Cases
Regulation Cases as Proportion of Total

1. Per Se Rules
As we saw in Part I, the Supreme Court has developed two per se
rules that are supposed to mandate compensation for implicit takings. The Loretto rule holds that when government action results in
permanent physical occupations, landowners are entitled to compensation regardless of the actual economic loss suffered. Similarly,
the Lucas rule holds, subject to what has come to be called the
“nuisance exception,” that landowners are entitled to compensation
when government action wipes out all economically productive use
of their land. These much-criticized per se rules appear to rest on
two similar justifications. First, permanent physical occupations
and complete wipeouts look very much like explicit takings in which
compensation follows as a matter of course.79 Second, per se rules
eliminate the need for case-specific determinations under the Penn
Central balancing test and therefore reduce the complexity and
volume of litigation.80
79. This justification appears in the Court’s opinions in Loretto and Lucas. In Loretto,
Justice Marshall labeled a permanent physical occupation “the most serious form of invasion
of an owner’s property interests,” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 435 (1982), and emphasized that permanent physical occupation effectively destroys all
rights in physical property—the right to possess, use, and dispose of the property—the same
rights the government takes in eminent domain, see id. (citing United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). In Lucas, Justice Scalia was even more explicit: “total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation.” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). Justice
Scalia went on to discuss “the practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and
appropriation.” Id. at 1019.
80. Again, the opinions in Loretto and Lucas suggest this justification. In Loretto, Justice
Marshall noted that the categorical rule requiring compensation of permanent physical
occupations “avoids otherwise difficult line-drawing problems” and “presents relatively few
problems of proof.” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37. In Lucas, Justice Scalia emphasized that cate-
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Our findings cast doubt on the proposition that these per se rules
simplify litigation or reduce its volume. A per se rule entitling a
landowner to compensation encourages landowners to tailor their
claims to fall within the rule. As a result, one would expect a success
rate far lower than 100 percent because of disputed questions of fact
about whether the claim falls within the per se rules.81 Our data is
consistent with that expectation.82 In many cases, however, landowners lose not because of questions about the scope of the per se
rule, but because courts do not know or understand Supreme Court
doctrine, or willfully ignore it or interpret it as having significant
play in the joints.83
a. Permanent Versus Temporary Physical Intrusion
We saw in Part I that Supreme Court doctrine differentiates
between permanent occupations and temporary invasions: the former are takings per se, whereas the latter are resolved case-by-case
in the process of Penn Central ad hoc review. To some degree, this
distinction, if courts were to observe it, would undermine the per se
rule’s reduction-of-litigation objective, because one would expect
parties to litigate the issue of a permanent occupation versus a
temporary invasion. Commonly, however, the distinction does not
figure in the decided cases. Indeed, Loretto, its per se rule, and the
distinction it draws between permanent and temporary physical
intrusions go unmentioned in the majority of cases involving government occupation of land. Perhaps because of inadequacy of
briefing by lawyers, 65 percent (73 out of 113) of the state court
cases involving physical intrusions, whether they find a taking or
not, cite no Supreme Court takings decisions.84 In those cases
gorical rules eliminate “case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of”
a governmental restraint. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
81. In an influential article, George Priest and Benjamin Klein theorized that litigation
success rates should converge toward 50 percent, especially as parties become better at
gauging the outcome of potential litigation. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD . 1, 19-20 (1984). For further discussion of the
Priest-Klein model in the takings context, see infra text accompanying notes 116-24.
82. See infra Table 2.
83. See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
84. Table 6, infra, contains a more thorough summary of state court citations of Supreme
Court cases in various categories. We did investigate the possibility that opinions in some
cases that did not cite Supreme Court precedents did cite state court precedents that
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upholding government actions that involve physical entry, the
opinions tend to focus not on the supposedly temporary nature of
the government entry, but rather on the justification for the
government’s action. A recurring fact pattern involves entry to
demolish a building government officials regard as a hazard to
health or safety.85 Courts could dismiss takings claims in these
cases by concluding that the government’s entry is only temporary.86
Instead, they choose to emphasize the need to protect public health
and safety.87 Similarly, when a government entity enters to remediate environmental conditions, courts do not say that they are
denying compensation because the installation is temporary; rather,
they emphasize the public interest in combating contamination.88 In
other cases, courts reject physical entry claims by concluding that
state law never protected landowners against the physical intrusion
involved. For instance, in two Arizona cases, the court held that a
landowner was not entitled to compensation when government
entities stored or transported water in a riverbed on the landowner’s
land, because owners of water had a pre-existing right to store or
transport water in existing riverbeds.89 Similarly, courts have
sustained statutes giving the public a right to cross beachfront land
without compensating the shorefront owner, on the ground that,
even before enactment of the statute, state law created a public
right to use the beachfront land.90
Nevertheless, landowners prevailed in physical entry cases with
far greater frequency than in most other categories of cases, as

themselves cited Supreme Court precedents.
85. See, e.g., Idlewild 94-100 Clark, LLC v. City of New York, 898 N.Y.S.2d 808, 820
(Sup. Ct. 2010); Mfrs. Guild, Inc. v. City of Enid, 239 P.3d 986, 988 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010);
German v. City of Philadelphia, 683 A.2d 323, 327 & n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
86. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Idlewild 94-100 Clark, LLC, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 820 (holding municipal demolition of a dangerous structure is an exercise of the police power and cannot constitute a
taking); Mfrs. Guild, Inc., 239 P.3d at 990 (emphasizing that statute permitting demolition
of dilapidated structure without compensation is designed to protect health, safety, and welfare, and therefore does not constitute a taking).
88. See, e.g., Brown v. California, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 689 (Ct. App. 1993).
89. S.W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 8 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2009); Western Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171,
1180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
90. See, e.g., McDonald v. Halvorson, 760 P.2d 263, 269-70 (Or. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d, 780
P.2d 714 (Or. 1989).
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indicated in Table 2. But landowner success is far from guaranteed,
and the difference between cases in which landowners prevail and
those in which government prevails seldom appears to have anything to do with the permanent versus temporary distinction drawn
by Supreme Court doctrine. The same is true of flooding cases,
which we investigated as a separate category in our study notwithstanding that they involve physical intrusions. Loretto made clear
(and suggested that earlier decisions by the Court had also made
clear) that permanent flooding triggered its per se rule, whereas
cases of temporary flooding were to be resolved by ad hoc review.91
Yet once again state courts have with great regularity decided flooding cases without citing Loretto and, more significantly, without
reference to the permanent versus temporary distinction or the
claimant’s right to ad hoc review at the least.92 The coincidence
could suggest judicial ignorance, and we did find at least one case
that was probably decided incorrectly.93 For whatever reason,
takings were found in only about a third of the flooding cases.94

91. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-28 (1982).
92. See infra Table 6.
93. See Farish v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 515 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(per curiam) (affirming, with no rationale stated, a trial court decision dismissing the claimant’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action, notwithstanding an allegation that 67
percent of his land had been, and would continue to be, flooded, destroying his cattle ranch
operation and working a permanent appropriation). We found a few other decisions that
seemed questionable but could perhaps be justified on some independent ground. Some cases
find no taking, as a matter of state law, when the government action in question was not
negligent, and some cases rely on state law that permits landowners (and, by extension, the
government) to flood neighbors’ land in a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Hauselt v. County of
Butte, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343, 348-49 (Ct. App. 2009).
It appears that it is not just state courts, but occasionally also federal courts, that have
trouble understanding Supreme Court doctrine regarding flooding and the law of takings. See,
e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522-23 (2012) (reversing a
decision by the Court of Federal Claims that flooding works a taking only if permanent or
inevitably recurring, and remanding for ad hoc review).
94. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2. Success Rates in Taking Cases by Category
Success Rate:
Total
Cases

No Taking Taking

Remand/
SJ/Denial

(Takings)/(No
Ripeness Misc.

Takings +
Takings +
Ripeness)

Regulation

1223

757

108

117

226

15

9.9%

70

31

26

11

2

0

44.1%

Exaction

117

57

29

16

15

0

28.7%

Flooding

132

62

35

27

8

0

33.3%

150

57

52

29

10

2

43.7%

234

115

56

47

14

2

30.3%

83

52

15

11

5

0

20.8%

Regulation/
Wipeout

Physical
Invasion
Enterprise
Condemnation
Blight

b. Wipeouts
Because Lucas was decided in 1992, thirteen years after the beginning of the period we studied, many of the earlier cases in our
sample were decided without the benefit of its per se rule (unless
one takes seriously Justice Scalia’s assertion that the rule had been
in place at least since a sentence of dictum in Agins v. City of
Tiburon).95 When we separated the cases decided in 1979-1992
from the cases decided in 1993-2012, the results were striking, but
not in the direction one might expect. After Lucas, the success rate
for wipeout claims dropped precipitously, as illustrated in Table 3.
Perhaps the case emboldened claimants who would not previously
have thought it worthwhile to challenge apparently confiscatory
regulations.96
95. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-18, 1016 nn.6-7 (1992) (discussing the importance of the phrase “or denies an owner economically viable use of his land”
(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
96. In contrast to the low rate of citations to Loretto and other relevant Supreme Court
cases in physical intrusion cases, wipeout claims exhibit a high citation rate of 68 percent, as
illustrated in Table 6.
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Table 3. Success Rates in Wipeout Cases Before and After Lucas
Succcess Rate:
Total
Cases

No Taking Taking

Remand

Ripeness Misc.

(Takings)/(No
Takings + Takings +
Ripeness)

19791992
19932012

34

10

18

6

0

0

64.3%

36

21

8

5

2

0

25.8%

The nuisance exception spelled out in Lucas does not figure
prominently in the post-1992 cases. Instead, we find the courts focusing on what constitutes denial of an “economically beneficial or
productive use.” 97 Suppose, for example, that a landowner’s property is located in a district that permits economically productive uses,
but lot-size or setback restrictions make it impossible to make any
use of the owner’s particular parcel. Does the fact that the landowner could make an economically productive use by combining
her lot with that of a neighbor take the case outside the categorical
rule? Some courts have held that restrictions like these fall within
the per se rule and require compensation,98 but others have disagreed, concluding that a landowner’s ability to sell to a neighbor
takes the case out of the categorical rule.99

97. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing the categorical rule in
Lucas that denying all economically beneficial or productive use is a taking); infra notes 98102 and accompanying text (discussing the state court tendency to focus on delineating what
is an economically beneficial or productive use).
98. See, e.g., Moroney v. Mayor & Council of Old Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045, 1048-49 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
99. See, e.g., Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000) (holding that denial
of a variance was not a taking when landowner could use the land for recreational use, emphasizing “the value of the property to abutters as an additional factor in determining the
value of the property”). Sometimes, courts simply deny compensation without any discussion
of Lucas or the categorical rule. See, e.g., Milburn Homes, Inc. v. Trotta, 776 N.Y.S.2d 312,
313-14 (App. Div. 2004) (rejecting a taking claim when the zoning board of appeals denied
landowner’s applications for area variances, leaving landowner unable to develop a substandard lot). Milburn cited Kransteuber v. Scheyer, 574 N.Y.S.2d 968 (App. Div. 1991), aff ’d,
599 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 1992), an earlier, pre-Lucas case in which there was testimony that a
neighbor offered to buy landowner’s substandard lot. Milburn, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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Disagreement becomes even more pronounced when landowners
challenge a combination of regulatory and market forces that leave
their land with no economically productive use. For instance, a
regulation might permit development on a landowner’s parcel, but
the cost of all permitted development might exceed the market
value of the completed development, whereas other development—
not permitted by the regulatory scheme—would be economically
feasible. Has the regulation prohibited all “economically beneficial
or productive use”?100 Suppose a zoning ordinance permits singlefamily homes, but traffic in the area or other market conditions
would not make it possible to sell single-family homes at prices that
exceed the cost of construction. Some courts have held, in that
circumstance, that the zoning restriction falls within the categorical
rule.101 Other courts have been more reluctant to apply the Lucas
rule in this situation, emphasizing that market conditions might
change, and that land might still have residual value based on the
chance that the permitted development will be feasible in the
future.102
A similar division occurs when government regulations impose
costs on landowners that exceed the value of the regulated property.
Some courts have treated such regulations as takings, without attempting to balance the loss to the landowner against the benefits
of the regulation. New York courts, for instance, have held that
regulations requiring landlords to restore buildings after fires are
takings when the restoration costs would exceed the value of the
restored improvement.103 By contrast, an Arizona court held the
Lucas wipeout rule inapplicable when the City of Phoenix enacted
a regulation requiring a building owner to retrofit an existing highrise building with sprinkler systems, even though the cost of
100. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
101. See, e.g., City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 46-47 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding
that residential zoning restriction falls within the Lucas rule when jury verdict, based in part
on expert testimony, determined that land had no value for residential purposes because
developed lots would be worth less than cost of development).
102. See, e.g., Rowlett/2000, Ltd. v. City of Rowlett, 231 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tex. App. 2007)
(acknowledging that, under current market conditions and current zoning, cost to develop
would exceed potential for revenue, emphasizing testimony by city’s appraiser that “the
highest and best use of the property is to hold the property for the future”).
103. Bernard v. Scharf, 675 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67-68 (App. Div. 1998), rev’d as moot, 711 N.E.2d
187 (N.Y. 1999). The court cited earlier New York cases for the same proposition, but did not
cite or discuss Lucas itself. Id.
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retrofitting the building would exceed the value of the building after the work was completed.104
Our point here is not to resolve the merits of these competing
approaches, but rather to demonstrate that the Lucas wipeout rule
has not, in practice, proved to be a per se rule. Instead, courts invoke a number of different grounds to deny compensation when
regulatory action leaves no economically beneficial right to develop
land.
2. Regulatory Takings Claims that Fall Outside the Categorical
Rules
We saw that when government actions generate neither permanent physical occupations nor permanent wipeouts, takings claims
are to be resolved by ad hoc Penn Central review (so too for most
other types of implicit takings, but bear in mind that our only concern in this section is with regulatory takings). The opinion in Penn
Central eschewed any formula for deciding cases on ad hoc review;
rather, it called for a balanced consideration of a number of factors,
each of them relevant, but none of them decisive.105 Each case is to
be examined in light of all its facts and circumstances. Essentially,
ad hoc review doctrine empowers state courts to reach whatever
result they like.
a. The Overall Picture
Our findings suggest that any sort of ad hoc balancing test is
rarely used, at least in cases challenging regulatory actions.
Instead, courts almost always defer to the regulatory decisions
made by government officials, resulting in an almost categorical
rule that Penn Central-type regulatory actions do not amount to
takings.106 With respect to such cases, some courts are explicitly
104. Third & Catalina Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 895 P.2d 115, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(concluding that Lucas was inapplicable because “[t]he City’s sprinkler retrofit ordinance is
not a land use regulation. The ordinance does not impose any restrictions on the use of land....
Compliance with the ordinance merely requires the expenditure of money, not the giving up
of land. There is no taking.”).
105. See supra Part I.B.
106. See supra Table 2. For a similar observation made some years ago, see Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM . L. REV. 1600, 1621-22 (1988).
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deferential, even in instances involving severe economic impact on
landowners.107 Many of them focus not on Penn Central, but on one
sentence expressed in Agins v. City of Tiburon108 and subsequently
expanded in a sentence of dictum from Dolan v. City of Tigard.109 In
Agins, Justice Powell wrote that “[t]he application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.”110 Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted the Agins formulation in Dolan, but subtly expanded the reach of the statement from “a general zoning law” to
“[a] land use regulation.”111 In many cases, state courts find a public
interest in the regulation at hand, find that it leaves owners with
some use of their land, and thus conclude that there has been no
taking.112 Others rely on Lucas for the proposition that no diminution in value caused by regulatory activity is too large, so long as
some economically beneficial use remains.113 In other words, they
treat Lucas’s floor on diminution in value as a ceiling as well, an
irony for anyone who thinks of the wipeout rule as one favoring
property owners. Still, other courts appear to ignore Supreme Court
doctrine altogether when evaluating regulatory takings claims, as
shown below in Table 6.

107. See, e.g., Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 703 P.2d 339, 344 (Cal. 1985) (“A land use
measure may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation ‘only when its effect is to deprive
the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his property.’” (quoting Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 31 (Cal. 1979))).
108. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
109. 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
110. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
111. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (“A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land.’” (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)).
112. See, e.g., Craft v. City of Fort Smith, 984 S.W.2d 22, 27 (Ark. 1998); Bonnie Briar
Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971, 974 (N.Y. 1999).
The Supreme Court subsequently retreated from its suggestion in Agins that a landowner
could prevail on a takings claim by showing that the regulation in question did not substantially advance state interests. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
In Lingle, the Court held that the “substantially advances” formulation “prescribes an inquiry
in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.” Id. at 540. The Court did not discuss, or question, the remainder of the
Agins dictum, namely, the statement that a regulation effects a taking if it denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.
113. See, e.g., Md. Aggregates Ass’n v. State, 655 A.2d 886, 899-900 (Md. 1995).
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Table 2 supports the conclusion that state courts have come close
to developing a categorical rule that regulatory actions do not constitute takings unless they are governed by one of the Court’s two
per se takings rules. In takings claims based on regulatory activity,
aggrieved landowners prevail in fewer than 10 percent of the cases
in our survey, and even that may overstate the success rate because
the table aggregates the results in all of the cases studied and does
not account for subsequent reversals.114 In fact, 22 of the reported
108 “taking” findings (20.4 percent) in Table 2 resulted in reversal
on appeal. By contrast, only 9 of the 757 “no taking” findings (1.2
percent) in Table 2 were reversed on appeal.115
The abysmal rate of success on these Penn Central claims raises
a substantial question: Why do lawyers persist in litigating these
cases to judicial decision when the prospect of success is so low? In
their now-classic article, George Priest and Benjamin Klein theorized that when parties can estimate their likelihood of success with
some accuracy, litigation success rates should generally approach 50
percent because lawyers will settle those cases in which the outcome
appears certain, leaving only difficult cases for trial.116 Our data
appears to be at odds with the Priest-Klein predictions.117
Several factors may explain the disparity. First, the Priest-Klein
model assumes that parties have the same, and accurate, information about the likely outcome of litigation, assumptions that have
caused Posner and Shavell to question its general predictive force.118
In takings cases, we suspect that government lawyers, as repeat

114. See supra Table 2.
115. Moreover, not all of the reversals led to a finding of a taking. In some cases, for instance, an appellate court reversed the court’s decision on other grounds, and never reached
the takings issue. See, e.g., E.T.O., Inc. v. Town of Marion, 375 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1985),
rev’g 361 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In other cases, the appellate court reversed and
remanded for reconsideration, concluding that the court below applied the incorrect legal
standard for evaluating the takings claim. See, e.g., Silva v. Township of Ada, 330 N.W.2d 663,
666-67 (Mich. 1982), rev’g 298 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
116. Priest & Klein, supra note 81, at 17-20.
117. Other studies have also found that trial win rates vary with various factors, including
legal standards that affect case strength. For a summary of these studies, and an argument
that asymmetric information and strategic bargaining may cause departures from a 50 percent success rate, see Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases,
43 J. LEGAL STUD . 209, 210-14 (2014).
118. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 849 (8th ed. 2011); Steven Shavell,
Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD . 493, 498-501 (1996).
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players, may have a better understanding of the results in most
takings cases.
Second, the Priest-Klein model assumes that settlement costs
are low relative to litigation costs.119 In land use cases, however,
settlement costs are often high because municipal lawyers do not
have authority to bind the parties whose consent would be necessary to accommodate a settlement acceptable to the developer.120 At
the same time, because many takings cases are decided at the
motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage, litigation costs are
not as high as they would be in cases requiring a full-blown trial.
Third, the Priest-Klein model assumes that the stakes of the dispute are symmetric to the parties.121 In many takings cases, that
assumption is false. A developer who succeeds on a takings claim
acquires a right that may be worth more, in dollar terms, than the
government defendant will ever have to pay.122 It may be in the developer’s interest to bring such high-value, low-probability claims,
and the government defendant has little incentive to settle these
claims beyond avoidance of litigation costs. Moreover, the developer
has an additional incentive to bring these low-probability claims:
reputation as a litigious developer may increase the likelihood that
a litigation-averse municipal entity will make concessions on future development applications.123
Fourth, agency costs may lead hourly fee lawyers to litigate
takings claims that are not in the interest of their clients.124 Our
119. Priest & Klein, supra note 81, at 13 (“We assume that litigation costs to the parties
are greater than settlement costs.”); see also id. at 13 n.34 (noting that if it would be cheaper
to litigate than to settle, the parties would litigate even if they had identical estimates of the
result in litigation); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule:
A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD . 233, 245
(1996) (concluding that when there are no savings from settlement, “the probability of a
plaintiff victory in a litigated dispute tends toward the probability of plaintiff victory in the
population as a whole”).
120. See Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 227, 228-36 (2011).
121. Priest & Klein, supra note 81, at 24.
122. See First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 316, 321 (1987) (holding that when a state action works a taking, the state must make
available a money damage remedy).
123. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments
and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1680 (2006) (noting that the risk aversion
of local governments with respect to taking claims may reduce the incidence of regulation).
124. See Kessler et al., supra note 119, at 246 (noting that hourly fee lawyers have
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research does not explain what combination of these factors accounts for the persistence of so many losing takings claims.
b. Disparities Among Regulatory Takings Claims
Although the aggregate success rate in regulatory takings claims
is far lower than the success rate for every other category,125 a more
finely grained analysis does reveal differences among regulatory
takings cases. When we identified the primary claim in each regulatory takings claim and categorized the cases by type of claim,
we discovered potentially significant differences, as illustrated in
Table 4. The table lists the nine most common subcategories of regulatory takings claims. We have excluded claims dismissed for
ripeness from Table 4, because opinions dismissing claims on ripeness grounds often do not provide enough information to reveal the
gist of the underlying claim. As a result, the success rates in Table
4 should not be compared directly to success rates in Table 2. If
ripeness cases were included, the success rates listed in Table 4
would be even lower.

incentives to defer settlement).
125. See supra Table 2.
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Table 4. Breakdown of Regulatory Takings by Category
Success Rate:

Total Cases
(Ripeness Ex- No Taking

Taking

Remand

cluded)
Diminution in

(Takings)/
(Takings + No
Takings)

392

341

18

33

5.0%

93

62

20

11

24.4%

64

51

10

3

16.4%

53

45

0

8

0%

46

34

3

9

8.1%

35

27

6

2

18.2%

Moratorium

34

25

5

4

16.7%

Vested Rights

25

20

3

2

13.0%

24

18

3

3

14.3%

Value
Tenant
Protection
Prohibition of
Pre-Existing
Use
Delay in
Deciding
Denominator
Issue
Requirement of
Out-of-Pocket
Expense

Does Not
Advance State
Interest

Table 4 demonstrates that diminution of value, taken alone,
virtually never suffices to support a regulatory takings claim.126
Successful takings claims almost always involve some interference
with an existing use. As Table 4 shows, of the four categories with
126. But, occasionally it does. Diminutions in value are sometimes sufficient to amount to
takings. See, e.g., D’Addario v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Darien, 593 A.2d 511, 516-17
(Conn. App. 1991) (91.4 and 89.5 percent diminution in value of two lots); City of Rome v.
Pilgrim, 271 S.E.2d 189, 190-91 (Ga. 1980) (diminution in value from $25,000-$30,000 to
$1500-$2000); Friedenburg v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451, 46061 (App. Div. 2003) (92.5-95 percent not enough to trigger the per se wipeout rule, but does
amount to a taking on ad hoc analysis under U.S. Constitution); City of Glenn Heights v.
Sheffield Dev. Co., 61 S.W.3d 634, 648 (Tex. App. 2001) (38 percent amounts to a taking under
state constitution), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004).
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the highest percentage of successful takings claims, three involve
interference with existing uses. Only moratoria do not, and the success rate of those claims is overstated because 3 of the 5 “taking”
determinations in that category were reversed or vacated on appeal.
Although tenant protection cases do generally involve interference
with an existing use, the success rate in those cases is also overstated because 9 out of the 20 “taking” determinations (45 percent)
were reversed on appeal. When those reversals are factored into the
analysis, the two categories that generated the most successful
claims were prohibitions on nonconforming uses and requirements
that landowners spend money out-of-pocket to continue uses that
had previously been permitted without those out-of-pocket expenditures.
3. Exactions
State courts cited Nollan127 and Dolan128 about two-thirds of the
time, and in any event appeared to be aware of their mandates.129
There was a difference of opinion in the state decisions regarding
whether conditions requiring landowners to pay money fell within
the scope of Nollan and Dolan,130 an issue the Court recently resolved in Koontz, which held that monetary exactions are subject to
the same rules governing exactions in kind.131 Our survey shows
that landowners prevail with somewhat greater frequency in exaction cases than in ordinary regulatory takings cases, although our
sample size is considerably smaller—both because Dolan was not
decided until almost midway into our study period, and because
landowners are less likely to litigate exactions than they are other
regulatory measures.132 This is because, by definition, in exaction
127. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
128. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
129. An earlier empirical study of state decisions, focused in part on Dolan and Nollan,
noted that surprisingly few state court decisions even mentioned those two cases in reaching
decisions subject to them, apparently giving them little significance in reaching their decisions. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 537.
130. Compare McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (Dolan does not
apply to impact fee), with Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (recreational fee subject to Dolan rule).
131. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).
132. See supra Table 2.
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cases the government is willing to approve development proposals
without litigation, provided the landowners agree to abide by the
conditions in question, and agreement is often less costly than litigation.133
4. Government as Enterpriser
A significant percentage of takings claims involved actions taken by government not as a regulator, but as a service provider.
Government entities at the local, state, and federal level build roads
and airports to facilitate transportation. Government entities operate a variety of public utilities—power lines, sewer systems, and
water lines—to service homes and businesses. Governments build
dams to provide power and irrigation, and jetties to protect beaches.
These activities can cause significant harm to neighboring landowners, even if the government does not directly or intentionally enter
the land of any neighbors. The single most common harm was from
flooding,134 but we also saw takings claims arising from government
enterprises causing fires,135 erosion,136 diversions of ground water,137
and pollution.138
Fifty years ago, Professor Sax developed an argument based on
a sharp distinction between economic losses imposed by the government as service provider, acting in its “enterprise capacity,” and
by the government as regulator, acting as a “mediator.”139 When the
government acts in its enterprise capacity, it functions much like
service providers in the private sector.140 Because private enter133. See Part I.D.
134. See, e.g., Preister v. Madison County, 606 N.W.2d 756, 758-59 (Neb. 2000) (involving
road work that caused flooding on farm land); Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 304 S.E.2d 164,
169 (N.C. 1983) (involving highway construction that increased flooding); Tarrant Reg’l Water
Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. 2004) (involving construction and operation of dam
that caused flooding).
135. See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. Rptr. 831 (App. 1985)
(involving fire damage caused by negligence in installing utility wires).
136. See, e.g., Ballam v. United States, 806 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (involving erosion caused by government creation of an artificial waterway).
137. See, e.g., Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730, 733 (Utah 2010).
138. See, e.g., Schick v. Fla. Dep’t of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. App. 1987) (alleging
negligent operation of program caused pollution of private wells).
139. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964).
140. Id. at 62.
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prisers have to pay for resources they acquire in the course of their
activities, so too should government enterprisers.141 Sax found sporadic support for his distinction in Supreme Court decisions.142
More recently, Maureen Brady examined another class of cases
in which the government acted as an enterpriser: nineteenthcentury cases in which municipalities regraded streets to reduce
the cost of transportation through hilly areas.143 She detailed the
growth in state court recognition of a right to compensation in these
cases.144
We have examined a broader range of cases than Sax or Brady,
and our findings, summarized earlier in Table 2, suggest that
courts treat government-as-enterpriser cases quite differently from
government-as-mediator cases. Table 2 separates flooding cases
from other enterprise cases—in part because when we began our
study we did not know what we would find—but the landowner
success rates in flooding and enterprise cases is, in any event,
nearly identical. Landowners succeed at a rate of 30.3 to 33.3
percent—more than three times the landowner success rate in
mediator (regulatory) cases.145
Table 5 shows another significant difference between regulatory
cases as compared to enterprise and flooding cases: the identity of
the primary government decision maker responsible for the actions
giving rise to takings claims. Although all government agents (except perhaps those protected by civil service rules) are ultimately
accountable to the public, our surmise is that local, elected officials,
such as village boards and city councils, are most directly accountable to voters for their actions, with a close second being members
of local agencies, such as zoning boards of appeal and planning
boards, that typically hold public hearings in the communities they
help govern. By contrast, career government officials and lower-level
government employees are typically less politically accountable.146
141. Id. at 63, 67.
142. Id. at 70 (observing that his test would “leave the majority of current holdings intact,”
but would require reversal of a number of old Supreme Court “grade crossing cases”).
143. See generally Brady, supra note 4.
144. See generally id.
145. See supra Table 2.
146. See David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers, 72
WASH . & LEE L. REV. 171, 197-98 (2015) (“Whereas members of Congress are more likely to
represent and be held accountable to their state constituents, agencies have no political con-
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Table 5 excludes decisions made by state and federal officials, and
decisions in which the opinion makes it impossible to determine the
identity of the primary decision maker. The data suggests that one
of the reasons courts offer for rejecting regulatory takings claims—
deference to decisions of elected or other politically accountable officials147—is largely absent in enterprise and flooding cases.
Table 5. Takings Claims by Government Decision Makers
Percent
Elected
Officials

Local
Boards or
Agencies

Local
Officials

Local

Total in All

Employees or

Four

Maintenance Categories

Percent

Involving

Involving

Elected

Elected

Officials or

Officials

Local
Boards

Regulation
Enterprise
Flooding

657

184

41

6

888

74.0%

94.7%

14

17

37

77

145

9.7%

21.4%

4

10

43

39

96

4.2%

14.6%

Our data sheds light on the role of deterrence as a policy objective
in takings cases. In his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego, Justice Brennan asked rhetorically, “After all, if
a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?”148 The data suggests, however, that deterrence plays little role
in most regulatory takings cases (exactions aside); courts apparently consider the political process an adequate check on the behavior
of regulators. By contrast, deterrence may assume more significance
in enterprise and flooding cases, in which courts typically review
decisions made by lower government officials and employees.

stituents.”).
147. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
148. 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
argued for imposing a damages remedy for takings, a position the Court ultimately adopted
in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321-22 (1987).

72

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:35

Courts often evaluate takings claims in the enterprise and flooding contexts in the same way they evaluate tort claims when the
tortfeasor is someone other than the government.149 They focus on
causation of or government culpability for the harm, issues that do
not arise the same way in regulatory takings cases.150 Sometimes
the causation inquiry is straightforward; if a claimant cannot prove
that a government-operated landfill was the source of the contamination of his land, the landowner cannot recover for a taking.151 At
other times, the causation issue is more complicated. For example,
when government construction of a dike, combined with an upstream logjam, leads to flooding of a landowner’s land, the question
arises whether the intervening cause, the logjam, relieves the government from liability.152
With respect to culpability, the decided cases generally agree that
the government has no duty to alleviate natural conditions, so
failure to undertake preventive measures does not constitute a
taking.153 The government also has no duty to insulate landowners
from the effect of neighboring private development, so no taking
results from government approval of a private development that
causes harm to neighboring landowners.154
When the government takes affirmative actions that result in
harm to landowners, generalization about government culpability
becomes more difficult. Although some courts hold that the with-

149. Takings doctrine provides a way around sovereign immunity for torts. See Jack M.
Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 283 (1988).
150. Sometimes, as with regulatory takings, courts dismiss claims because the government
action causes insignificant harm. See, e.g., Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 62
(Iowa 2001) (finding landowners unsuccessfully claimed that authorization of a five-day county fair, which would feature figure-eight auto racing, constituted a taking of their adjacent
land).
151. See Clark v. Greenville County, 437 S.E.2d 117, 118-19 (S.C. 1993).
152. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan County, 177 P.3d 716, 717-18 (Wash. App. 2008),
aff’d, 238 P.3d 1129 (Wash. 2010).
153. See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 385 (2014) (noting that “courts have largely resisted compelling
governmental action” in takings cases in which the government did not have an affirmative
duty to act).
154. See, e.g., Phillips v. King County, 968 P.2d 871, 878 (Wash. 1998) (finding county not
liable for mere approval of a private development project that later caused injury to plaintiff’s
property).
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drawal of services cannot constitute a taking,155 others have indicated that landowners are entitled to compensation for losses
resulting from the closing of an adjacent road.156 When operation of
a government enterprise causes harm, some courts hold that the
government action constitutes a taking if the government conducted the enterprise negligently or unreasonably,157 while others insist
that only an intentional act can constitute a taking.158 Still, other
courts have held that even an intentional act causing significant
harm to a landowner cannot constitute a taking when the act was
designed to protect public safety.159
These doctrinal disparities should not be surprising. Although
Supreme Court takings doctrine plays only a limited role in determining results in regulatory takings cases, Supreme Court
doctrine plays virtually no harmonizing role in the enterprise and
flooding cases. As Table 6 demonstrates, only about 20 percent of
state court enterprise cases, and fewer still of flooding cases, cite
any Supreme Court takings decisions in evaluating takings claims.
By contrast, although many state court opinions ignore Supreme
Court takings decisions even in regulatory takings cases, a majority do cite at least one, and the percentage of exaction cases citing
Supreme Court takings decisions is even higher. The infrequency of
citation to Supreme Court decisions in enterprise and flooding cases
undoubtedly reflects, in part, the paucity of recent Supreme Court
decisions that deal with these issues. Therefore, lower courts are

155. See, e.g., Adams v. Bradshaw, 599 A.2d 481, 486 (N.H. 1991) (holding shutting down
sewer system not a taking even though landowner had no means to dispose of his sewage).
156. See, e.g., Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. State, 456 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519-20 (App. Div. 1982)
(affirming denial of state’s motion to dismiss when landowner alleged that closing of one
street adjacent to landowner’s bank facility constituted a taking).
157. See, e.g., Barham v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 432 (Ct. App. 1999)
(holding landowners entitled to recover for taking when wildfire resulted from negligent
operation of overhead electrical power line equipment).
158. See, e.g., Rolandi v. City of Spartanburg, 363 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that construction of inadequate sewers could not constitute a taking); City of Dallas
v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2004) (applying definition of intent from RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS (AM . LAW INST . 1965)).
159. See, e.g., Lewis v. DeKalb County, 303 S.E.2d 112, 114-15 (Ga. 1983) (breaching dam
in a way that caused flooding of landowner’s parcel not a taking because county acted to
prevent hazard posed by too much upstream water).
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freer to craft local doctrines, and they more frequently rely on the
takings clauses found in their respective state constitutions.160
Table 6. Frequency of Citation to Supreme Court Takings
Decisions
Cases Find-

Cases

ing Taking Percentage

Percentage

Taking and

Citing

and

Citing

Citing Su-

Supreme

Citing

Supreme

preme

Court

Supreme

Court

Court
Physical

Finding No

Court

Total
Cases Citing
Supreme
Court

Percentage
Citing
Supreme
Court

13/41

31.7%

17/49

34.7%

30/90

33.3%

Flooding

11/33

33.3%

3/53

5.7%

14/86

16.3%

Wipeout

15/23

65.2%

19/27

70.4%

34/50

68.0%

Regulation

52/77

67.5%

243/473

51.4%

295/550

53.6%

Enterprise

9/54

16.7%

23/96

24.0%

32/150

21.3%

Exaction

18/28

64.3%

35/46

76.1%

53/74

71.6%

6/17

35.3%

17/56

30.4%

23/73

31.5%

Invasion

Condemnation Blight

5. Condemnation Blight
A complete picture of implicit takings doctrine must include
cases in which the threat of formal condemnation, or the condemnation of neighboring land, substantially diminishes the value
of a landowner’s parcel. Even when the government never formally
condemns private land, condemnation can adversely affect land
value. Landowners sometimes claim harm from condemnation of
neighboring parcels or, more frequently, from government
announcements that it is considering plans that could lead to
condemnation actions,161 and these, even if eventually abandoned,
160. A number of state takings clauses require compensation for “damaging,” as well as
“taking,” property. See Brady, supra note 4, at 4-5. The “damaging” language generally
emerged as a means to ensure compensation for street regrading. Id. at 18, 21.
161. See, e.g., Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Tr. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 54 P.3d 294,
295-96 (Alaska 2002); Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Ser., 739 A.2d 680, 681, 68485 (Conn. 1999).
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might in the interim have depressed land value by scaring off potential buyers or tenants (it is as though the government acquired
an option to condemn without paying for it).162 Building moratoria
have a similar effect, but landowners generally lose in both sorts of
cases; however, Table 2 indicates that their success rate is somewhat higher than in run-of-the-mill regulatory takings cases. With
respect to condemnation blight cases in particular, courts might be
concerned that if announcements of possible government actions
were to trigger liability for compensation, officials might shy from
engaging in useful public discourse about construction of roads or
public facilities. Even when the condemnation process moves to the
next level and the government announces plans to condemn particular parcels, blight claims often fail unless aggrieved landowners
can show some legal restraint—rather than a market restraint—on
their ability to sell or develop their land.163 Occasionally, however,
takings have been found only when market forces, arising from long
delays, effectively precluded development. In Johnson v. City of
Minneapolis, for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court awarded
compensation when the city imposed a “cloud of condemnation” over
a landowner’s parcel, noting that “the cumulative effect of the City’s
actions ... constituted an abuse of the City’s condemnation authority.”164
6. Identity of the Claimant
Developers add value to land by obtaining regulatory approvals.
Their business model is based on the risks and delays inherent in
the approval process. Because they are repeat players in the development business, they are in a position to diversify their investment
risk over many different development projects. By contrast, the
162. See Davis v. Brown, 851 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ill. 2006) (using option terminology).
163. See, e.g., Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm’n, 284 N.W.2d 887, 893 (Wis.
1979). If the government does impose legal constraints, compensation may still be unavailable if a process is in place, enabling landowners to force the government to make a final
decision about condemnation. See Davis, 851 N.E.2d at 1206 (sustaining Illinois statute giving
Department of Transportation 120 days to initiate eminent domain proceedings, and allowing
landowner to develop if Department did not bring proceedings within that time).
164. 667 N.W.2d 109, 111, 116 (Minn. 2003). The court decided the case under the
Minnesota Constitution’s takings clause, and therefore did not decide whether the city’s actions were a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 115.
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investment of homeowners, business owners, and landlords is more
likely to be concentrated in a single parcel of land, making diversification more difficult. In addition, homeowners, business owners,
and landlords, but not developers, are likely to have made significant investments in improvements threatened by government
action, while the primary risk to developers involves reduction in
land value. Table 7 suggests that the identity of the claimant plays
some role in the outcome of takings cases because in every category
other than flooding, homeowners, commercial (business) owners,
and landlords are much more likely to prevail on takings claims
than are developers.
Table 7. Takings Claims by Type of Landowner
Percent of
Successful
Enterprise
Cases

Percent of
Successful
Flooding Cases

Percent of
Successful
Regulation
Cases

Percent of
Overall
Success Rate

Commercial

35.0%

20.0%

11.3%

19.4%

Developer

16.7%

28.9%

6.0%

13.4%

Homeowner

30.3%

25.0%

9.9%

23.6%

Insignificant

Insignificant

Number

Number

19.5%

21.4%

Landlord

This disparity may reflect a combination of two factors. First,
courts may be less sympathetic to developers with diversified portfolios. Second, a developer, as a repeat player, may secure advantages from acquiring a reputation for litigiousness, leading the
developer to bring weak cases that one-shot plaintiffs would forgo.
7. The Federal Courts (the Supreme Court Aside)
Most of the foregoing survey of Supreme Court implicit takings
doctrine in practice has focused on decisions by state courts. Before
going on, we want to say a few words about the work of the inferior
federal courts. As indicated in Part I, the Supreme Court held in
Williamson County that when a claimant challenges a state action
as a taking, the claim is not ripe unless and until the state denies
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compensation.165 As a matter of logic, Williamson County’s ripeness
doctrine should have eliminated from federal court almost all claims
alleging regulatory takings by a state or municipality.166 Our findings suggest that federal courts got the Supreme Court’s message,
even if many litigants did not. A significant number of claimants
continued to proceed in federal court, but with almost no success.
More than 40 percent of the federal court claims alleging state or
local regulatory takings were decided on ripeness grounds.167 In
total, of 290 federal decisions involving alleged takings by states or
municipalities, only 13 resulted in a finding that a taking had occurred.168 Moreover, of those thirteen decisions, more than half were
vacated or reversed on appeal—a far higher percentage of reversals
than in our survey as a whole.
By contrast, claims alleging a regulatory taking169 by federal government action met with significantly more success than other
regulatory takings cases, either in federal or state court, as indicated in Table 8. The table overstates the success rate of federal
claims involving federal actions, and also federal claims involving
state actions, because 8 of the 14 “taking” findings were ultimately
reversed or vacated on appeal. The reversal rate is nearly identical
in the two classes of federal claims, so the disparity remains: federal
courts are more receptive to takings claims based on federal actions
than to claims based on state actions, even after accounting for the
effect of ripeness doctrine. Because the number of successful claims
is so small, we hesitate to offer an overarching reason for the difference, although we think that institutional concerns may provide
a partial explanation. Landowners adversely affected by local regulation can seek relief from state courts and legislatures; those
avenues are not available to victims of federal regulation.
165. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
166. See Madeline J. Meacham, The Williamson Trap, 32 URB. LAW . 239, 239 (2000). See
generally J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave: The Story of San
Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under
a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF . L. REV. 247
(2006); Sterk, supra note 72.
167. See infra Table 8.
168. See infra Table 8.
169. Relatively few federal court cases involve implicit takings claims other than regulatory
takings claims. Because of the small sample size for other categories, we only consider regulatory takings claims.
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Table 8. Federal-State Comparison
Total
State Court

No
Taking

Taking

Remand

Ripeness

Misc.

Success
Rate

845

584

80

83

93

5

10.6%

290

129

13

20

120

8

5.0%

80

40

14

14

11

1

21.5%

Federal
Court/ State
Action
Federal
Court/ Federal Action

D. State Legislation
The constitutional bottom developed by the Supreme Court
leaves not just state courts, but also state legislatures (or citizens,
by way of plebiscites), free to grant greater protection to property
rights than the Constitution mandates,170 and a handful have
availed themselves of this opportunity.171 Here we provide a quick
summary.
Six states (Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon,
and Texas) have enacted statutes providing for compensation in
certain instances in which it might not be required by Supreme
Court doctrine. These statutes, like takings doctrine itself, provide
symbolic support for the property rights, but, outside of Oregon,
their practical impact has been uncertain at best. The Mississippi
and Louisiana statutes protect only the owners of agricultural
land, and have generated no published opinions.172 Florida’s statute
170. See Kirk Emerson & Charles R. Wise, Statutory Approaches to Regulatory Takings:
State Property Rights Legislation Issues and Implications for Public Administration, 57 PUB.
ADMIN . REV. 411, 412-14 (1997) (“Property rights legislation is being introduced and adopted
by the states at a dramatic rate.”).
171. Property rights legislation designed to limit power to condemn land for economic
development purposes—the most common statutory supplement to constitutional protections—is outside the scope of our study. A recent and excellent study is ILYA SOMIN , THE
GRASPING HAND : KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015).
172. The Mississippi statute applies to any action by the state that “prohibits or severely
limits the right of an owner to conduct forestry or agricultural activities on forest or
agricultural land.” MISS. CODE ANN . § 49-33-7(e) (2016). The Louisiana statute gives a right
of action to “[a]n owner of private agricultural property.” LA. STAT. ANN . § 3:3610(A) (2015).
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applies to government action that “has inordinately burdened an
existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real
property.”173 An inordinate burden arises only when the government
action disables a landowner from attaining “the reasonable investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or
a vested right to a specific use of the real property,” or when the
owner “is left with existing or vested uses that are unreasonable
such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate
share of a burden imposed for the good of the public.”174 By its
terms, the statute does not appear more expansive than existing
constitutional doctrine, and the few Florida cases interpreting the
statute have construed it narrowly.175 The Texas statute is more
broadly applicable, encompassing government actions that cause “a
reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected
private real property,”176 but Texas courts have not been sympathetic to landowner claims in the few cases that have been litigated.177
Most state legislatures have been unwilling to expand constitutional
constraints on implied takings.178
Statutes in the other two states—Oregon and Arizona—were not
enacted by state legislatures, but were instead the products of
voter initiatives.179 The Arizona statute starts with the broad statement that if enactment or enforcement of a land use law “reduces
the fair market value of the property the owner is entitled to just
compensation,”180 but it goes on to except all laws that limit land use
“for the protection of the public’s health and safety.”181 Authority

173. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (2016).
174. Id. § 70.001(3)(e)(1).
175. See, e.g., Turkali v. City of Safety Harbor, 93 So. 3d 493, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(dismissing landowner’s claim because landowner’s appraisal was defective); Holmes v.
Marion County, 960 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that denial of extension
of special use permit for landfill did not “inordinately burden” landowner’s property, despite
landowner’s argument that denial of the permit interfered with an existing use).
176. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (West 2015).
177. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Guthrie, 332 S.W.3d 578, 591, 598-99 (Tex. App. 2009)
(holding that lessees lack standing under the statute, and that claims of landowner fall within
an immunity exception).
178. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 257-58.
179. See Private Property Rights Protection Act, Prop. 207, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1563;
Act of June 15, 2007, ch. 424, 2007 Or. Laws 1138.
180. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN . § 12-1134(A) (West 2016).
181. Id. § 12-1134(B)(1).
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interpreting the statute has been sparse. A 2012 Arizona appellate
opinion held that a municipality’s statement of purpose does not
conclusively establish that a regulation was enacted to protect
health and safety,182 but to date, no reported decision has required
compensation under the statute.183
The situation in Oregon stands in marked contrast to that in the
other states. Oregon voters have enacted two separate property
rights initiatives. Measure 37, approved by voters in 2004,184 included language and an exemption similar to that in the Arizona
statute.185 Measure 37 gave government entities a choice: either
they could pay for the decline in market value caused by a challenged regulation, or they could waive enforcement of the regulation.186
By the end of 2007, Oregon landowners had filed more than 6850
claims for government payment or waiver, covering more than
750,000 acres of land.187 Although Measure 37 had been championed
as a protector of the rights of homeowners, timber and mining interests filed many of the largest claims,188 provoking a backlash that
led to Measure 49, a modification approved by voters in 2007.189
182. Sedona Grand, LLC v. City of Sedona, 270 P.3d 864, 870 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
183. An opinion of the Arizona Attorney General, if reflective of the likely judicial response,
suggests that it will not take much for an ordinance to escape the statute’s reach. See Statutes
Requiring Paving or Stabilization of Parking Lots and Driveways as Air Pollution Control
Measures, Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. I08-011 (2008). The attorney general concluded that a statute
requiring paving of parking lots did not require compensation because the statute in question
was designed to reduce air pollution by reducing dust in the environment. Id.
184. See Legal Information, OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., http://www.oregon.
gov/lcd/pages/measure37/legal_information.aspx#Information_About_the_Election
[https://perma.cc/GX26-FFUX] (last updated Jan. 1, 2008) (discussing the election results for
Oregon Measure 37).
185. The codified statute provides that if a public entity “enacts one or more land use
regulations that restrict the residential use of private real property ... and that reduce the fair
market value of the property, then the owner of the property shall be entitled to just
compensation.” OR. REV. STAT . § 195.305(1) (2016) (originally codified at OR. REV. STAT.
197.352 (2005)). The statute exempts regulations “[t]hat restrict or prohibit activities for
the protection of public health and safety.” Id. § 195.305(3)(b).
186. See Edward J. Sullivan & Jennifer M. Bragar, The Augean Stables: Measure 49 and
the Herculean Task of Correcting an Improvident Initiative Measure in Oregon, 46
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 577, 582-83 (2010).
187. Id. at 589. For a discussion of additional effects of Measure 37, see id. at 587-89. See
generally Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the
Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (2009) (using the Measure 37 experiment to
analyze modern debates about property regulation and takings laws).
188. See Sullivan & Bragar, supra note 186, at 586-87.
189. See OR. REV. STAT. § 195.301.
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Measure 49 entitles landowners to compensation only when regulations limit residential uses or farming or forestry practices.190
Much of the statute’s language was designed to limit the remedies
of landowners who filed claims under Measure 37.191 Nevertheless,
both Oregon initiatives have had a significant effect on land use
within the state,192 even though most of the litigation about the
measures has focused on procedural issues surrounding the impact
of Measure 49 on pre-existing Measure 37 claims.193 Regarding
states other than Oregon, the remaining unknown is whether statutory enactments have had, or will have, an effect on the regulatory
process. To date, they have not resulted in litigation success for
landowners.
III. A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
We shall come back to the data gathered in our survey, but first
it proves useful to turn from facts to theory. As mentioned earlier, modern takings theory seems to have begun with Professor
Dunham.194 His 1962 article surveyed “a long series of judgments
that appear to make up a crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine on the law of expropriation”; his purpose was “to discover
whether the Court’s judgments in this area reveal a rational plan
or only a haphazard accumulation of rules.”195 He discovered the
latter.196 Several notable articles citing Dunham and seemingly
provoked by his work appeared just a few years after its publication.197 Countless studies have been published since, and many
190. See § 195.310(1)(b).
191. See, e.g., § 195.312 (limiting number of homes claimant under Measure 37 would be
entitled to build).
192. See OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., BALLOT MEASURES 37 (2004) AND 49
(2007) OUTCOMES AND EFFECTS, at 37 (2011) (reporting that 6100 new dwellings have been
authorized under Measure 49’s treatment of claims filed under Measure 37).
193. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., 296 P.3d 561, 564-66 (Or. Ct.
App. 2013).
194. See supra note 4. The cases Dunham surveyed concerned three areas of takings law—
the public use requirement, the measure of just compensation, and implicit takings—but fully
half of his attention was given to the last area. See Dunham, supra note 4, at 71-105.
195. Dunham, supra note 4, at 63-64.
196. See id. at 105-06.
197. See generally, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax,
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of them are fashioned on a template familiar to takings aficionados and plainly attributable to Dunham. The academic community
has taken his work as a challenge, much in the way that mathematicians responded to Fermat’s last theorem. The task was to find,
as Dunham could not, the “rational plan” (if any) behind the
(apparent) “crazy-quilt pattern” of implicit takings doctrine.198
Frank Michelman has said that most of the post-Dunham legal
writing on our subject has “two aims—rationalization of existing
decisions and advocacy of a ‘sound’ principle.”199 The statement was
prescient. It was made in 1967, when the corpus of pertinent
scholarship consisted of only a handful of items, but it is as apt
today as it was then. We can restate Michelman’s observation in
terms of the familiar distinction between positive and normative
theory, the first of which undertakes to explain (Michelman’s
“rationalization”), the second to evaluate in terms of some “‘sound’
principle” (as Michelman put it).200
A. The Historical Tension Between Private Property and State
Power
Our theorizing is of the positive sort. At its base is the observation, mentioned in our introductory remarks, that two ongoing but
often conflicting commitments have figured prominently throughout history of the Union—a commitment to strong rights of private
property, on the one hand, and a commitment to an activist state,
on the other.
The first proposition is familiar and incontestable; a good historical overview is provided by James Ely, who carefully documents his
claim that “Americans have long seen individual property rights as
the fountainhead of personal liberty and political democracy.”201
Nevertheless, as Ely shows with many examples, “the high standing
supra note 139.
198. Dunham, supra note 4, at 63-64.
199. Michelman, supra note 197, at 1171 n.14.
200. We agree with Michelman that the two approaches “tend to spill into one another.”
See id.
201. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 172 (3d ed. 2008). Ely notes the early influence of the Magna
Carta, id. at 13-14, and of John Locke’s view of property as a natural right that the government has the duty to protect, id. at 17.
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of property rights ... did not preclude restrictions on ownership,”
even early in the history of the republic.202 This should hardly be
regarded as surprising.
Our proposition regarding the commitment to an activist state
was at one time debatable, though the matter seems to have been
settled by the revisionist work of William Novak and others. Novak
observes “that the American state is and always has been more
powerful, capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and redistributive
than was recognized in earlier accounts of U.S. history,” and that
the historical record “reveals ample evidence of the construction of
American state power from the earliest days of the republic to the
very recent past.”203 In short, American history is marked throughout by an ongoing tension between the rights of private property
owners and the rights of the public to govern property for the sake
of a sound social order.204
B. The Impact of the Tension on Takings Jurisprudence
We suggest that the general story about property and the state
can be observed in the particular story of takings. In our view, the
ins and outs of takings doctrine can be understood as a means to
maintain and reinforce, in a very particular fashion, the conflicting
commitments to property and state. Begin with the two cases,
Pumpelly and Mahon, that we introduced early on.205 Pumpelly and
Mahon each struck a blow for property rights, and for the principle
that legal doctrine should be structured to ensure that government
officials respect those rights. Both opinions contain rhetoric about
the sanctity of property, and about the need to preclude government
officials from taking shortcuts in pursuit of legitimate government
202. Id. at 18.
203. William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM . HIST. REV . 752,
758 (2008); see also WILLIAM J. NOVAK , THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH -CENTURY AMERICA 235-36 (1996) (an empirical study discussing “the
overwhelming presence of the state and regulation in nineteenth-century American life”).
Novak notes that “[p]ublic regulation—the power of the state to restrict individual liberty and
property for the common welfare—colored all facets of early American development.” Id. at
2.
204. The tension is explored in detail in GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PRO PRIETY : COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT , 1776-1970 (1997).
205. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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ends.206 That rhetoric continues to pervade opinions both in the
Supreme Court and elsewhere, and may be responsible in part for
the plethora of unsuccessful takings claims our survey uncovered.
That is, the rhetoric may have generated a form of acoustic separation207: the message to the public at large, and even to some
developer lawyers, has been that property rights remain sacrosanct,
while doctrine in operation imposes few restraints on the everyday
operations of the state. With limited exceptions, doctrine, developed
and implemented jointly by the Supreme Court and the state courts,
has left protection of property in the hands of government officials.
1. The Limited Force of Per Se Rules
One might think that the Supreme Court’s per se takings rules
contradict the observation that takings doctrine lacks muscle, but
as our study demonstrates, operation of the per se rules highlights
their impotence.
a. Permanent Physical Occupations
Start with Loretto and the categorical rule that government actions resulting in permanent physical occupations are takings,
period.208 Loretto itself represented a partial retreat from the broad
language of Pumpelly, which suggested that any invasion worked a
taking: “where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced
additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any
artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair
its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution.”209 Invasion compromises the power to exclude, which, as the
Court in Loretto said, “has traditionally been considered one of the
most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”210
206. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415-16 (1922); Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1872).
207. The term originated with Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984).
208. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1952).
209. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181. To be sure, the flooding in Pumpelly was permanent, but the
Court’s ruling in the case did not depend on that.
210. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. Variations on the phrase run through the Court’s opinions
like a melisma in a Gregorian chant. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
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But in holding that all permanent occupations, however trivial, were
takings per se, but temporary invasions were not, the Loretto court
embraced a rule that is curious in several respects.211 First, if actual
invasion is the feature of concern, why should its duration matter,
other than as a proxy for the degree of loss suffered by aggrieved
property owners? Second, if degree of loss is the point, why not review all physical intrusion cases in the same ad hoc manner the
Court uses to review all cases in which a taking has not been found
on the basis of either of its two per se rules?212 This is exactly the
view expressed in the dissenting opinion in Loretto. Constitutional
rights should not turn on a “formalistic quibble” about permanent
versus temporary,213 nor, indeed, on whether there has been some
physical contact, because neither distinction distinguishes, “even
crudely, between significant and insignificant losses.”214
Despite the dissent’s impeccable logic, it missed the point. The
majority’s objective, in our view, was chiefly rhetorical. It wanted to
stress emphatically that the right of property owners to exclude is
of fundamental importance, but to do so in a way that had little
impact on actual government operations. The Court admitted as
much: describing its holding as “very narrow,” it affirmed the
“historically rooted expectation of compensation” for physical occupations in which “the character of the invasion is qualitatively
more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation”; but, at the same time, it did not “question the equally
substantial authority upholding a State’s broad power to impose
appropriate restrictions upon an owner’s use of his property.”215
831 (1987).
211. The Court acknowledged that earlier cases, decided after Pumpelly, had settled the
proposition that, although temporary invasions might be adjudged takings, they were not
takings per se. Instead, they were to be decided on a case-by-case basis of ad hoc review. See
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427-35 (discussing the line of cases).
212. See Underkuffler, supra note 4, at 2020 (asking why government can, in some instances, destroy property without compensation, but may not physically invade property
without compensation).
213. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442, 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Sax, supra note 139,
at 37).
214. Id. at 447 (quoting Michelman, supra note 197, at 1227).
215. Id. at 441 (majority opinion). The Court mentioned as a makeweight that its holding
avoided “otherwise difficult line-drawing problems.” Id. at 436. But as the dissent observes,
it does not, because of the obscure meaning of “permanent.” See id. at 448 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text, suggesting, based on our
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Horne reinforces the point. Chief Justice Roberts observed that
“[t]he Government thinks it ‘strange’ and the dissent ‘baffling’ that
the Hornes object to the reserve requirement, when they nonetheless concede that ‘the government may prohibit the sale of raisins
without effecting a per se taking.’”216 His response: “But that distinction flows naturally from the settled difference in our takings
jurisprudence between appropriation and regulation. A physical
taking of raisins and a regulatory limit on production may have
the same economic impact on a grower. The Constitution, however,
is concerned with means as well as ends.”217 In other words, like
Loretto, Horne amounts to little more than a wink and a nod to the
government: next time, do it right.
Our survey of state court cases demonstrates that, despite the
language in Loretto and Horne, the permanent physical occupation
rule interferes little with state regulation of land. Regulatory permanent physical occupations are a very rare bird. Of the 150
physical invasion cases in our survey, 70 percent arose from government enterprise,218 and many of the invasions appear to have
been accidental, or the result of ignorance of the law on the part of
employees conducting operations at work sites. These enterprise
cases accounted for 86 percent of the successful physical invasion
claims. Most of the remaining 30 percent of physical intrusion cases
involved government efforts to prevent nuisances, to conduct environmental cleanups, or to demolish unsafe structures. Even though
the physical occupation or invasion in many of these cases could
easily have been characterized as permanent (what is more permanent than destruction of a building?), state courts have had no
difficulty upholding the government action without payment of
compensation—often without any citation to Loretto.219
empirical study, that the Court’s per se rules neither reduce the rate of litigation nor simplify
judicial inquiries.
216. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015).
217. Id.
218. Some data from the cases we surveyed in our study: We identified 150 physical
invasion cases; 70 percent of the cases arose from governments acting in their enterprise
capacity; 25.3 percent arose from government intrusions to prevent or regulate nuisances, to
conduct environmental cleanups, or to demolish unsafe structures.
219. See, e.g., Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[W]e cannot conceive of any set of facts in which the mere remediation of a contaminated
site, even if it resulted in physical damage to the property, could result in a taking for public
or private use.”); 409 Land Trust v. City of South Bend, 709 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind. Ct. App.
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b. Wipeouts
Next consider Lucas and its categorical rule that takings always
arise from government actions depriving property of all economically beneficial or productive uses (common law nuisance controls
aside).220 Given our discussion of Loretto,221 we can be very brief
here. The two cases are different in terms of property rights rhetoric—Lucas being more moderate in this respect—but similar in
terms of accommodating an active state. Just as the Court noted in
Loretto that its narrow rule left broad powers in the government,222
so it noted in Lucas that its per se rule, applicable only to “relatively
rare situations,” posed no threat to the ability of government to
continue.223
Our survey demonstrates the Court’s prescience on this issue.
Only about 3.5 percent of regulatory taking cases involve plausible
wipeout claims, and the landowner is ultimately successful in fewer
than half of those.224 Some state courts have gone so far as to reject
wipeout claims when legal rules preclude any permissible construction on the landowner’s parcel, emphasizing the recreational value
of the land and its potential value to abutting owners.225
2. The Futility of Penn Central Claims
As a matter of Supreme Court doctrine, the inapplicability of per
se rules need not prove fatal to a takings claim. Temporary physical
invasions and regulations that do not work invasions might still
1999) (“[T]he demolition of the properties was an exercise of the City’s police power to protect
the public from unsafe buildings.”).
More generally our data show that 86.5 percent of successful physical invasion claims
involved government enterprise; only 9.6 percent of successful physical invasion claims
involved government regulatory activities.
220. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
222. See Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440-41 (1982).
223. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). The narrowness of the
majority’s rule prompted Justice Blackmun to remark that “the Court launches a missile to
kill a mouse.” Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224. See supra Table 2.
225. See, e.g., Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000) (noting that the
court below, in rejecting taking claim, properly considered “uses of property for parking,
picnics, barbecues, and other recreational uses,” as well as value to abutters).
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amount to takings, depending on how they fare in the course of caseby-case ad hoc adjudication, commonly known as Penn Central
review.226 In fact, Penn Central balancing involves little more than
a rhetorical bow to private property rights in the course of upholding state or local regulation. The Court itself has never applied the
supposed balancing test to invalidate a state or local regulation,227
and our survey demonstrates that in state court practice, relegation
to ad hoc adjudication has marked the death knell for a takings
claim.
Two of the Court’s own doctrines stack the cards decidedly in
favor of the state. First, the Court’s rejection of conceptual severance means that, with the exception of physical intrusions, burdens
imposed on property owners are figured in terms of an entire parcel,
not just the particular part targeted by government action.228 Justice
Brandeis, dissenting in Mahon, was the first to articulate objections
to conceptual severance,229 and, ultimately, the Court embraced the
Brandeis position, overruling almost all of Mahon—although only
implicitly—save for the idea that if diminution goes too far, there is
a taking.230
Second, the Court’s doctrine also plays fast and loose with the
constitutional requirement of just compensation in the event of a
taking. The convention is that if property is taken, compensation is
to be paid in money, and be a full and exact equivalent of the
property’s market value.231 So, for example, if a regulation goes too
226. See supra Part I.B.
227. See Sterk, supra note 72, at 287.
228. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
229. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The majority held that “the extent of the diminution” in value should be considered when evaluating the
limits on the police power. Id. at 413 (majority opinion). Brandeis responded:
If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we
should compare it with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the
value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole property. The rights
of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in
his property into surface and subsoil.
Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
230. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987). The
facts in Keystone were virtually identical to those in Mahon. We should add, by the way, that
in Mahon, Holmes took the position that the legislation in question could not be justified as
a safety measure. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15. Brandeis once again disagreed, id. at 417-18
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), as did, implicitly, the Court in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
231. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1934).
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far in diminishing value, the government cannot simply choose to
pay the limited amount that would reduce the diminution to the
point where it did not go too far.232 Suppose, however, that the limited compensation is initially built into the regulation. Does that
work? Penn Central held that it does, and that the compensation
need not even be paid in money, but could instead consist of
transferable development rights.233 Although these rights, the Court
conceded, “may well not have constituted ‘just compensation’ if a
‘taking’ had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and,
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the
impact of regulation.”234 In the view of Justice Scalia, concurring in
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a move like that in
Penn Central was nothing but sleight of hand, “a clever, albeit
transparent, device,” by which “the government can get away with
paying much less” than the just compensation required by the
Constitution.235 We are inclined to agree with that.
In effect, the Court has been content to delegate the responsibility
for policing regulatory abuses to state courts. Our survey demonstrates that state courts, in turn, have been content to respect
decisions made by the political branches. Fewer than 10 percent of
regulatory takings claims are successful, and the percentage is even
smaller for those claims that do not involve interference with an
existing use of land.236
3. The Limited Impact of Other Property-Friendly Rules
We turn finally to three pieces of Supreme Court doctrine that
appear, contrary to all the foregoing instances, to enhance the rights
of property owners at the expense of state prerogatives; although,
appearances here can be misleading.

232. Some years ago, a very interesting piece of student writing argued that such limited
compensation should be constitutionally acceptable, saying that “it is hard to see why
compensation need be greater than the amount necessary to leave the property holder above
the ‘too far’ point.” Developments in the Law—Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1499 (1978).
233. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
234. Id.
235. 520 U.S. 725, 747-48 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
236. See supra Table 4.
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The first piece of doctrine relates directly to Penn Central review
and has to do with the standing of claimants who purchased their
land after enactment of the regulations they allege to be takings.
For some time, most courts held that such post-enactment purchasers had no grounds to complain, because they were on notice,
and also because they were probably already compensated, so to
speak, by paying a lesser price for their land than would otherwise
be the case.237 The oddity of this position was that it could let the
government take without ever having to pay, to the detriment not
just of the post-enactment buyer, but also the pre-enactment
seller.238 This, the Court said in Palazzolo, “ought not to be the rule,”
and thus held that it no longer is.239 The point is well-taken, but
unlikely to matter a great deal, because even though claimants now
have standing that they did not before, they are very likely to lose
their cases in the course of ad hoc review.240
The second piece of doctrine might be more substantial in its impact, although we are hardly sure. We refer to First English and its
holding that if government action works a taking, the property
owner is entitled to the remedy of just compensation from the time
the taking arose until the time the action is abandoned or altered to
avoid the taking.241 The Court intended to call a halt to the abusive
practice in some states, most notably California, of limiting claimants to injunctive relief, which left the government free to try again
(and again, etc.) without ever having to pay.242 The Court’s plan has
not been completely successful. A number of states have attempted
to evade the doctrine by holding that the abusive regulation in
question was not authorized by state law and was therefore a
nullity. Since the government’s action did not count, it could not be
a taking and did not require compensation.243 To a considerable
237. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616, 626 (2001).
238. See id. at 627.
239. Id.; see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
240. Moreover, the rule is not likely to have much effect on the ex ante behavior of regulators, because at the time government imposes the regulation, regulators are not likely to
know when or whether owners will transfer their interests. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 251.
241. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
242. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987).
243. See, e.g., Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Cal. 1998);
Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Township of Warren, 777 A.2d 334, 336 (N.J. 2001).
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degree, however, most government actions will involve regulations
subject to ad hoc review, meaning they will not be held to work
takings in the first place.244
The third and last piece of doctrine—that concerning exactions—
clearly does strike a strong blow for property rights.245 The Court
has not simply constrained exactions practice but also required that
compliance with the constraints is to be examined with heightened
scrutiny—a departure from the far more deferential standard of
review ordinarily applied in implicit takings cases.246 Most recently,
in Koontz, the Court extended its rules to exactions of money as well
as exactions in kind.247 Koontz was decided after we concluded our
empirical survey, so we have nothing to say about its reception by
the states. Even though its precise implications are opaque, the
decision has already proved to be very controversial. Our impression
is that most commentators regard it as a considerable—which is not
to say commendable—victory for advocates of strong property
rights.248
Thus, with the exception of exactions, the Court’s support of
strong property rights has been largely symbolic,249 whereas its
support of an activist state has been substantial and operationally
significant.
4. The Role of the States
Given our theoretical perspective, what role have the state courts
played in resolving the tension between private property and the
demands of an activist state? In light of the Supreme Court’s limited
244. See Sterk, supra note 72, at 287.
245. See supra Part I.D.
246. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 50 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287, 334-36; Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name:
Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 403-04 (2014).
249. Frank Michelman expressed a similar view regarding Supreme Court implicit takings
doctrine as it stood in 1987. See Michelman, supra note 106, at 1628 (saying the Court’s per
se rules have “the feel of legality and the feel of resonance with common understanding of
what property at the core is all about,” then adding that “doctrines like these, which at the
most obvious level are instrumentally and even logically vulnerable, can still make sense
ideologically as tokens of the limitation of government by law”).
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docket, state courts have been critical both in the development and
implementation of takings doctrine. One question is whether they
have been faithful to the constitutional mandates imposed by the
Supreme Court. Another is whether they have been ambitious in
exercising their freedom to protect property rights more than the
Court insists they must. The first question is somewhat difficult to
answer, especially with respect to the Court’s two per se rules. State
courts regularly write opinions in physical intrusion cases, flooding
cases, and wipeout cases that make no explicit reference to governing Supreme Court doctrine;250 moreover, whether they cite the
Court or not, they often reason in ways suggesting that they pay
the doctrine little mind, whether out of ignorance or spite. One could
try to deal with such cases by considering whether the results they
reach, as opposed to the reasons they provide, appear to be consistent with what doctrine demands, but that method is unreliable.
Courts write opinions with conclusions in mind, and, in consequence, might distort or ignore relevant facts and circumstances;
hence, no reliable evidence exists by which to judge the fidelity of
decisions.
We surely cannot say that state courts roundly ignore the rules,251
but we do have the impression that they wander off untethered to
an unsettling degree.252 But whether the decisions in such cases are
nevertheless principled—though not in terms of Supreme Court doctrine—is another matter entirely. State courts viewed as a whole
have developed a more finely granulated analysis than one finds in
the Court’s decisions. This might be in part a function of sample
size. The population of relevant Supreme Court cases is small,
whereas the population of state court cases for the years we studied
is several thousand. The larger the population examined, the more
likely that discrete and interesting clusters would appear, and so
250. See supra Table 6.
251. For example, we found many instances in which courts found no taking on the ground
that the aggrieved property owners had purchased their land after the allegedly offending
regulation had been enacted, yet this practice stopped entirely once Palazzolo held that postenactment purchase did not bar takings claims.
252. This is true regarding ad hoc review cases as well. We found very few opinions
showing courts marching with rigor through the multitude of factors mentioned in Penn
Central. State courts have considerable practical, if extralegal, freedom because claimants
alleging takings have limited effective access to the federal courts. See supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
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they have. The state courts consider a number of factors, noted at
several points in our discussion, that strike us as consistent with
the spirit of the Takings Clause, if not the letter of takings doctrine.253
So much for state court fidelity to Supreme Court doctrine.
Regarding the ambitions of state governments to protect private
property more than the Court says they must, state courts and
legislatures on the whole do not seem particularly interested in
moving significantly beyond the constitutional bottom, with just a
few exceptions.254 The states must cope with the same conflicting
commitments to strong property rights and active government that
confront the Supreme Court, and, by and large, they have taken the
Court’s path.
***
In short, our study suggests that Supreme Court doctrine has
neither inspired nor constrained state lawmakers in any significant fashion. Although the Court continues, on sporadic occasions,
to decide cases in ways that purport to fortify property rights,
modern doctrine has largely reduced the property rights rhetoric of
Pumpelly and Mahon to a whisper. Only two developments truly
fortify private property rights: the broadened right to compensation
provided by First English (which, while generating very few actual
awards of compensation, has undoubtedly instilled fear in many
would-be regulators), and the close governance of exactions provided
by Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. But generally speaking, the Court
has seemed far more attentive to the needs of the state than to the
claims of private property owners. We think this pattern is unlikely
253. See supra Part II.C.
254. There are a few instances of state court ambition, however. One example has to do
with the compensation remedy afforded by First English. Several states adopted such a
remedy even before it became a constitutional mandate; they were moved by Justice
Brennan’s dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. See Rankin, supra note 66, at 424. Another example: we found a handful of state cases recognizing a cause of action for judicial
takings and one case finding that such a taking had occurred. Judicial takings were not
directly relevant to our survey because the Supreme Court has yet to recognize them, though
it has come close. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 714-15 (2010). On state judicial takings decisions generally, see Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1471-72 (1990).
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to change, even if the ideological balance on the Court tips to the
right. A majority on the Court, whether liberal or conservative, has
to reckon more moderately than it otherwise would, because it is one
thing to champion a view, and another to make that view the law of
the land.
The Court’s abdication has opened an opportunity for state courts
to take the lead in policing state and local regulators. They could
have done so by resting property-friendly decisions on state constitutions and statutes. Alternatively, they could have interpreted the
Federal Constitution more expansively than the Supreme Court,
knowing that the Court would be unlikely to overturn state court
decisions according greater protection to property rights. But they
have not taken that course; indeed, our findings suggest that in
some instances state courts have provided less protection than the
Court insists they must. When regulation is at issue, state courts,
like the Supreme Court, appear content to leave local officials
accountable to voters, not to judges, despite the oft-cited concern
that land use regulation has the potential to single out victims who
may have little clout in the local political process.
Nor have state legislatures intervened to any significant degree,
with the notable exception of the legislative outburst of legislative
activity in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo,255 which
expressed a very relaxed view of the public use requirement in the
law of eminent domain.256 And even the post-Kelo reforms have
struck some property rights advocates as less effective than what
had been expected.257 Exactly what made Kelo so salient is anybody’s guess, but it is likely that it will take such salience, very hard
lobbying, or both to move state legislative bodies out of the status
quo. Still, given the unlikelihood of significant shifts on the part of
the Supreme Court and state courts, political action—especially at
the state level—might be the best way for advocates to use their
limited resources.258

255. See, e.g., SOMIN , supra note 171, at 141-64.
256. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-80, 484 (2005).
257. See, e.g., SOMIN , supra note 171, at 136, 141-64, 173-78.
258. See Charles Fried, Protecting Property—Law and Politics, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
44, 45 (1990) (suggesting that property rights advocates should take their fight from the
courts into the political arena).

2016]

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IMPLICIT TAKINGS

95

Our study was designed to increase understanding of how takings doctrine operates “on the ground,” but our survey goes only so
far. By focusing on decided cases, we have ignored an important
piece of the puzzle: what effect does takings law have on government
agents, municipal officials in particular, at the decision-making
stage? Does the prospect of litigation serve to deter overregulation
even when, in fact, the litigation is likely to be unsuccessful?
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s jawboning has an effect that cannot
be discerned from examining cases alone. But that is a subject for
another day.

